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THE DEATH PENALTY: CAN IT BE FIXED?
Kenneth Williams'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the American Bar Association called for a moratorium on the
death penalty.' Since then, calls for a moratorium have been widespread;
those urging a moratorium include a current United States Supreme
Court Justice,2 a former President of the United States,3 several major4
newspapers, and numerous political5 and religious leaders.6 Calls for a
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1. See James Rodgers, Time Out for Executions, 83 A.B.A. J. 26 (1997). The
resolution identified four specific areas of concern: 1) competency of counsel; 2) the
system of habeas corpus; 3) racial discrimination; and 4) execution of the mentally
retarded and persons under eighteen. Id.
2. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg endorsed a proposed moratorium on the death
penalty in Maryland. See Oklahoma Governor Commutes Death Case; Texas Bill Boosts
Defense For Poor, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 2001, at A8.
3. Former President Jimmy Carter, who signed Georgia's current death penalty law
when he was governor in 1973, now endorses a moratorium. See Henry Weinstein, Death
Penalty Moratorium Attracting Unlikely Adherents, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17,2000, at A5.
4. See Death Penalty; It's Time for Texas To Pause, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr.
22, 2001, at 2J; Maryland's Execution Pause, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2001, at B6; Half A
Step On Executions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 2000, at 12; Walk the Talk, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2000, at B6; It's Time To Step Back and Study the Death Penalty;
Moratorium: Legislature Should Want to Ensure Fairness Before It Kills Again in the Name
of Justice, BALT. SUN, Mar. 27,2001, at 8A.
5. See Corzine Urges Death Penalty Delay, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at B4
(announcing U.S. Senator Jon Corzine's support for a moratorium); Felix G. Rohatyn,
U.S. Leadership Is Compromised by Death Penalty, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21, 2001 (stating that
a former U.S. ambassador to France supports a moratorium "while we review the whole
issue of capital punishment"); Delay in U.S. Death Sentences Is Urged, CHI. TRIB., June 16,
2001, at 16; Prominent Leaders Urge President Clinton To Halt Federal Executions, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/newvoices.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2002) (stating that a
federal moratorium was urged by Julian Bond, chairman of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People; Robert Litt, Associate Deputy Attorney General in
the Clinton Administration; and thirty-one others).
6. Cardinal Theodore E. McCarrick of Washington indicated support for the death
penalty moratorium in Maryland. See Caryle Murphy, McCarrick Objects to Execution
Viewing; 'Vengeance Belongs to God,' Cardinal Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2001, at A4;
see also Henry Weinstein, Group Calls for a Moratorium on Federal Executions, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A34 (reporting on a letter to former President Clinton urging a
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moratorium have come from both conservatives' and liberals.' The high
point in the moratorium movement occurred in February 2000 when
Governor George Ryan of Illinois declared an indefinite halt to
executions in his state because of serious flaws in the death penalty
process.9  Several states are considering similar action,"' and the
Nebraska legislature voted to halt executions in the state." By the end of
2000, more than twenty-four municipalities passed resolutions asking
their states to stop executions. 2
Some individuals calling for a moratorium are actually abolitionists
who hope that instituting a moratorium will be the first step toward
abolition, as was the case in many European nations. 3 Others support
capital punishment but have called for a moratorium because they are
concerned about the manner in which the death penalty is administered. 4
moratorium on federal executions signed by Bishops Joseph A. Fiorenza of Houston,
Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, and Roger M. Mahony of Los Angeles).
7. Those supporting a moratorium include religious broadcaster and former
Republican presidential candidate Pat Robertson. See Robertson Backs Moratorium, Says
Death Penalty Used Unfairly, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2000, at A12. Concerns about capital
punishment have also been expressed by conservative columnist George Will and
conservative radio talk show host and Iran-Contra figure Oliver North. See Death Penalty
Repeal Ok'd by Lawmakers in New Hampshire, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 19,
2000, at Al.
8. Democratic Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin proposed a suspension of all
federal executions pending a review of death penalty procedures. See New Looks at the
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at A14.
9. See Gov. Ryan Halts the Death Penalty; Calls for a Study of State's Messed-Up
System, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8,2000, at A4.
10. Nineteen states currently are considering moratoriums on the death penalty. See
Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Support for Death Penalty Eases; McVeigh's Execution
Approved, While Principle Splits Public, WASH. POST, May 3, 2001 at A9. In addition,
studies of the death penalty process are underway in Nebraska, Arizona, North Carolina,
Maryland, and Indiana. See Fixing the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 2000, at 22.
11. The bill was subsequently vetoed by the Nebraska governor. See Robynn Tysver,
Moratorium Vetoed Death Penalty Timeout Is Poor Policy, Johanns Says, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, May 26,1999, at Al.
12 See Fixing the Death Penalty, supra note 10.
13. For example, the United Kingdom abolished the death penalty in 1973 but carried
out its last execution in 1964; France abolished the death penalty in 1981 but carried out its
last execution in 1977; Finland abolished the death penalty in 1949 but carried out its last
execution in 1944; Greece abolished the death penalty in 1993 but carried out its last
execution in 1972; and Belgium did not abolish capital punishment until 1996 but carried
out its last execution in 1950. See David Baldus, Reflections on the Use of Capital
Punishment in Europe and the United States, Mar. 31, 2001 (handout on file with author).
14. For instance, although Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium in Illinois
pending an investigation by a special commission that was formed to review the death
penalty system and to propose recommendations for improvement, he spent his political
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These individuals sincerely believe that the death penalty can be "fixed"
once executions have been halted and reforms have been implemented. 5
In asking the Texas legislature for a moratorium, a Texas representative
illustrated this sentiment by saying: "Let's fix the whole system once and
for all."16
So far, the moratorium movement has been effective. Public opinion
polls indicate that a majority of Americans support suspending
executions. 7 However, this paper argues that the movement has made a
tremendous mistake in expending its political capital on a moratorium.
While the movement is likely to succeed in temporarily suspending
executions in a number of states and at the federal level, it is unlikely
that it will succeed in ensuring that the death penalty is carried out in a
fair manner. In fact, proponents have failed to demonstrate how a
moratorium will cure the death penalty's ills. This paper argues that the
moratorium movement is likely to have the effect of simply legitimating
the death penalty.
This paper begins by identifying the major problems associated with
the implementation of capital punishment in the United States. This
paper then discusses potential solutions for each problem and provides a
critical analysis of each proposed solution. Part III demonstrates that
even if every proposed reform were implemented, the death penalty still
cannot be "fixed," primarily because of the intractable problem of
racism. Finally, Part IV shows that the death penalty should be limited
to war criminals and mass murderers because those are the only
situations in which the death penalty can be administered in a manner
that is compatible with our legal system's commitment to fair and equal
treatment.
career ardently supporting capital punishment. See Fixing the Death Penalty, supra note
10.
15. See id.
16. See Polly Ross Hughes, Lawmaker Asks for Halt in Executions, Hous. CHRON.,
Jan. 19,2001, at A35.
17. See Morin & Deane, supra note 10. A survey showed that fifty-one percent of
Americans favored "halting all executions until a commission is established to determine
whether the death penalty is being administered fairly." Id. Support for a moratorium
rose to fifty-seven percent when respondents were informed of the Illinois governor's
imposition of a moratorium in his state. Id. A bipartisan survey found that nearly two-
thirds of voters polled support suspending the death penalty until its fairness can be
assessed. See Mark Stricherz, Survey Finds Support for Moratorium on Executions, CHi.
TRIB., Sept. 15,2000, at A13.
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II. PROBLEMS
This section identifies the major problems with the administration of
the death penalty. It then analyzes proposed solutions and their
potential to "fix" the death penalty.
A. Racism
One of the most persistent and difficult problems with the death
penalty in the United States is that it has been administered in a racially
discriminatory manner. During slavery, "certain crimes committed
against whites were punishable by death for black offenders but not for
white offenders,"' 8 and blacks were "prohibited from testifying in their
own defense and from serving on juries."' 9 Even after the abolition of
slavery, black defendants have been sentenced to death in numbers
disproportionate to their percentage of the population °  and
disproportionate to white defendants.2' In fact, prior to the abolition of
the death penalty for rape, black defendants convicted of raping whites
were sentenced to death in vast disproportion to other offender-victim
racial combinations. 2 Even today, the death penalty is more likely to be
sought and imposed in cases involving white victims.
1 3
18. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
171,175 (2001).
19. Id.
20. African Americans make up approximately thirteen percent of the U.S.
population. See U.S. Census Bureau, The Black Population in the United States (Mar.
1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p2-530.pdf. Of people
sentenced to death in the United States, thirty-five pecent are African Americans. See
Death Penalty Information Center, Race of Defendants Executed Since 1976, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicrace.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
21. Whites make up approximately seventy-five percent of the U.S. population. See
U.S. Census Bureau, The White Population: 2000 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrOl-4.pdf. Of people sentenced to death, fifty-
six percent are white. See Death Penalty Information Center, Race of Defendants
Executed Since 1976, supra note 20.
22 See Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 175 (citing Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc
Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119, 125 (1973),
which concluded that "black men accused of raping white women were eighteen times
more likely to be sentenced to death than white defendants").
23. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 709-10
(1983). Professor David Baldus studied the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia
and found that the prosecutor sought the death penalty in seventy percent of cases
involving a black defendant and a white victim; fifteen percent of cases involving a black
defendant and a black victim; and nineteen percent of cases involving a white defendant
and a black victim. Id. Furthermore, Professor Baldus found that, controlling for 230
1180 [Vol. 51:101
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Moreover, studies have shown that various actors in the death penalty
process have engaged in racial discrimination. For example, studies have
demonstrated that prosecutors24 were more likely to seek the death
penalty where the defendant was black and the victim was white.2 In
Texas, an audit of criminal trials revealed that, in at least eight capital
cases, the prosecution may have presented testimony of an expert witness
who cited the convicted defendant's ethnic background - that is,
Hispanic or African-American - as evidence of his future
dangerousness. 26 This was a key element in deciding whether to give a
defendant the death penalty." In addition, even after the Supreme Court
struck down a law excluding blacks from jury service, 8prosecutors have
used peremptory challenges to remove blacks during jury selection in
order to maintain all-white juries.2 ' There have been studies and direct
proof that indicate that racist attitudes of jurors have resulted in the
imposition of the death penalty against black defendants. 30 Finally,
judges3" and defense attorneys have made statements on the record
indicating their racial biases against black defendants.32
non-racial factors, a person accused of murdering a white individual was 4.3 times more
likely to be sentenced to death than a person accused of murdering a black individual. Id.
See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,287 (1987).
24. For a discussion of the treatment of African Americans by prosecutors, see Paul
Butler, Starr Is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV. 705
(1999).
25. Id.
26. See Steve Lash, Texas Death Case Set Aside; US. Supreme Court Sees Possible
Racial Bias, HOus. CHRON., June 6,2000, at Al.
27. See id.
28. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880).
29. See Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 176.
30. Id. at 244-66 (providing narrative accounts of how jurors reached their sentencing
decisions); see also Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75-100
(examining the impact of jury discrimination on jury verdicts); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial
Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 528 (1995) (quoting a memo written by Justice
Scalia, in which he acknowledges "that unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is
real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable").
31. See Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd 963 F.2d 1403
(1Ith Cir. 1991), rev'd 506 U.S. 357 (1983) (noting that both the trial judge and defense
counsel referred to the defendant as "colored"); Peek v. Florida, 488 So.2d 52, 56 (Fla.
1986) (acknowledging that the defense attorney heard the trial judge refer to the parents
of the African-American defendant as the "nigger mom and dad").
32. See Goodwin v. Balkom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that
defense counsel called defendant "a little old nigger boy" during closing argument).
2002]
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Given these trends, the most daunting challenge in "fixing" the death
penalty is to eliminate racial bias in its imposition. However, the United
States Supreme Court has refused to do so. In McCleskey v. Kemp,33 the
defendant argued that Georgia administered its capital punishment
process in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.34 Specifically, the defendant proffered a study that
examined over 2000 homicide cases in Georgia and controlled for 230
non-racial factors.35 The results demonstrated that a person accused of
murdering a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to
death than a person accused of murdering a black victim. 6 The Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's claim and held that an Equal Protection
claim could only be proven by demonstrating that the decision-makers in
a particular case had used race as the basis for their decision.37
Because evidence of intentional discrimination by the prosecutor,
judge, or jury would only be available in the unlikely event of an
admission, legal challenges to the death penalty on account of its racist
imposition are not likely to succeed. Thus, eliminating racism must be
accomplished through legislation. Three specific legislative proposals
have either been advanced or adopted as solutions.
1. The Racial Justice Act
In 1994, the United States House of Representatives passed the Racial
Justice Act (the Act) . The Act did not prohibit the death penalty.39
Rather, it allowed a defendant the use of statistical evidence to show
racial bias in the imposition of the death sentence in a particular case.
Although it never became law,4" the Act would have worked as follows:
A defendant challenging a death sentence as racist would be
required to prove a pattern of racially discriminatory death
sentences in the relevant jurisdiction. The Act requires the
showing of bias in the particular sentence being challenged. It
would not be enough to show that blacks get the death penalty
significantly more frequently than whites for the same type of
33. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
34. Id. at 286.
35. Id. at 286-87.
36. Id. at 287.
37. Id. at 292-93.
38. Racial Justice Act, H.R. 4017, 103d § 2921 (2d Sess. 1994).
39. Id.
40. See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 530. The Racial Justice Act never became law
because of opposition by the Republican Party. Id.
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offense. Any statistical analysis would need to compare cases
similar in level of aggravation to the case being challenged.
The Act provides that the court must independently evaluate
the validity of the evidence presented to establish the inference
of racial discrimination and must determine if it is sufficient to
provide a basis for the inference. The defendant must make a
statistically significant showing of discrimination that takes into
account the relevant non-racial aggravating and mitigating
factors. Then, the court must have concluded that the evidence
is accurate and valid and supports an inference of racial
discrimination.
If the court found that the defendant produced such proof,
the burden then would have shifted to the government to
provide a non-race based explanation for the sentence.
Prosecutors could meet this burden by showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is an explanation
other than race bias to explain the death sentence in the
particular case .... The death sentence would stand so long as
the prosecutor could prove by a simple preponderance of the
evidence, a non-race based reason for the sentence.41
The Act's approach mirrored the approach that the Supreme Court
adopted in order to eliminate racism in jury selection in Batson v.
Kentucky.42 Although it was rejected at the federal level, similar laws
have been proposed on the state level, but to date, only Kentucky has
adopted such a law.43
41. Id. at 530-31 (citations omitted).
42. 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
43. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300 (Michie 1999). The Kentucky Racial Justice Act,
which differs somewhat from the proposed federal Racial Justice Act, reads as follows:
(1) No person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death that was sought on
the basis of race.
(2) A finding that race was the basis of the decision to seek a death sentence may
be established if the court finds that race was a significant factor in decisions to
seek the sentence of death in the Commonwealth at the time the death sentence
was sought.
(3) Evidence relevant to establish a finding that race was the basis of the decision
to seek a death sentence may include statistical evidence or other evidence, or
both, that death sentences were sought significantly more frequently:
(a) Upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race; or
(b) As punishment for capital offenses against persons of one race than as
punishment for capital offenses against persons of another race.
(4) The defendant shall state with particularity how the evidence supports a
claim that racial considerations played a significant part in the decision to seek a
death sentence in his or her case. The claim shall be raised by the defendant at
the pre-trial conference. The court shall schedule a hearing on the claim and
shall prescribe a time for the submission of evidence by both parties. If the court
2002] 1183
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While passage of the Racial Justice Act or similar state legislation
would be laudable, its potential effectiveness in eliminating racism in the
imposition of the death penalty is unlikely. Claims under the Racial
Justice Act would likely meet the same fate as claims alleging racial
discrimination in jury selection under Batson. Despite Batson, race
continues to be a major determinant in the use of peremptory
challenges. For example, a study of 317 capital murder cases tried by
jury in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997 found that "discrimination in
the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of race and gender by both
prosecutors and defense counsel is widespread, 45 and that "United States
Supreme Court decisions banning these practices appear to have had
only a marginal impact.' 46
Race continues to be used in the exercise of peremptory challenges
because courts rarely sustain challenges to such practices. Batson, like
the proposed Racial Justice Act, requires a defendant to put forth a
prima facie case of "purposeful discrimination., 47 Once the defendant
has put forth such a case, the prosecutor is required to offer a neutral
explanation for the strikes.48 Courts are then required to examine the
prosecutor's explanation, and if the explanation is insufficient or
pretextual, the defendant's objection should be sustained. However,
Batson objections are rarely sustained because of courts' hostility toward
such claims.* Courts simply accept as neutral the prosecutor's
finds that race was the basis of the decision to seek the death sentence, the court
shall order that a death sentence shall not be sought.
(5) The defendant has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that race was the basis of the decision to seek the death penalty. The
Commonwealth may offer evidence in rebuttal of the claims or evidence of the
defendant.
Id.
44. See David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 121-22 (2001).
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id.
47. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,96 (1985).
4& Id. at 97.
49. Id. at 98.
50. Concerning Batson, one federal judge remarked:
What the courts have done, as a practical matter, is to redefine the word
peremptory to a point where on a challenge by anyone regardless of the race,
nationality, religion, sex, minority or majority status or whatever, a valid reason
must be given, i.e., they have all but eliminated the word peremptory from all
jury selection statutes and rules and decreed that cause must be shown for all
questioned challenges.
In addition, as a practical matter, the appellate court, in holding that
punishment for the prosecutor's having (allegedly) deprived two or three jurors
1184 [Vol. 51:101
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explanation for eliminating black venire members, no matter how
implausible. In one Texas murder case, the prosecutor eliminated three
of four black venire members based on their beliefs that the O.J.
Simpson verdict was correct, which resulted in the defendant being tried
by an all-white jury." After the defendant made a Batson objection, the
prosecutor claimed that the prospective jurors were struck because of the
similarities between the case at hand and the O.J. Simpson case.52 Both
the trial and appellate courts refused to sustain the defendant's Batson
objection; however,
[t]he fact that [the prosecutor] did not inquire into the thought
processes of the African American members to determine if
their opinions were based on the quality of the evidence, or just
part of a group bias caused by the polarizing effect that
developed when the Simpson case received national attention in
the media, is evidence ...[that] the prosecutor intended to
eliminate all African Americans from the jury panel, regardless
of how their opinions were formulated.53
Furthermore, the Philadelphia study regarding peremptory challenges
found that "[a]mong the twenty-four capital cases in this study in which
[Batson] claims appear to have been made, appellate relief does not
appear to have been granted in a single case." Similarly, a LEXIS
search of decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
of their "rights" to serve on a particular jury, has decreed that the public must
pay for the alleged wrongdoing by footing the cost of additional hearings and/or
a new trial. The consequence, however, of holding such a new trial so many
years later, with the attendant problems relating to evidence and witnesses,
might be the undeserved award of freedom from incarceration to this defendant,
who committed both matricide and patricide, either now or in a sooner time
frame than he currently faces. Why innocent and unwitting citizens and
taxpayers should suffer from the infliction of such penalties is unexplained. Also
unexplained, as the dissent in Campbell points out, is how this remedy vindicates
the rights of excluded jurors. More appropriately, if judges are to be permitted
to fashion punishment in cases such as this, they should suspend a wrongdoing
prosecutor (if one be so found) from practice or some other appropriate action
should be taken against him or her - not against innocent parties.
Tankleff v. Senkowski, 3 F. Supp. 2d 278, 279-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
51. Shelling v. State, 52 S.W.3d 213, 217-20, 224 (Tex. 2001). The prosecution used
the fact that the fourth African American was employed by Goodwill as a reason to strike
her. Id. at 228 (Price, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 217.
53. Id. at 227-28 (Price, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
54. Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 123. See generally Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme
Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L.
REV. 511 (1994) (arguing that excluding jurors based on race is unjust and exacerbates
racial discord in America).
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Circuit-which encompasses Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi, three
Southern states with large minority populations-turned up only one
criminal case in which relief was granted under Batson." In one case
involving a Hispanic death row inmate, the Fifth Circuit refused to
sustain a Batson objection despite the fact that "[t]he prosecution and the
defense counsel explicitly agreed to exclude all eight black venire
members from the jury, and the trial judge approved the agreement.
56
Given the explosiveness and emotion of capital murder cases, courts are
likely to be just as unreceptive to claims under legislation like the Racial
Justice Act as they have been under Batson.
Finally, racial justice acts modeled after Kentucky's are not likely to be
any more effective in combating racism. The Kentucky statute focuses
on the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty.57 It permits an
attack on the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty in the event
that the defendant is able to prove "by clear and convincing evidence"
that the decision was motivated by race.58 Given the defendant's high
burden of proof, an attack on the prosecution's decision to seek the
death penalty will be difficult to sustain except in the unlikely event of an
admission by the prosecutor.
2. Jury Instructions
Two federal statutes seek to eliminate racism from the jury
deliberation process in the federal death penalty system. First, at the end
of the sentencing phase, the judge instructs the jury members that they
may not in any way consider the race, national origin, sex, or religious
55. Searching Batson turned up a total of 239 decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. In United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1989), the
prosecutor used six peremptory challenges to strike Mexican-Americans from the jury. Id.
at 836. Since the district court made no Batson findings, the case was remanded. Id. at
838.
56. Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Munoz, 15 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1994) (allowing the prosecutor to strike Spanish-
speaking jurors and an African-American juror because "she has got children who were
on welfare"); United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 925 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
government used six of its nine peremptory strikes to exclude African Americans from the
jury.) The government struck a black female police officer because one of the prosecutors
had prosecuted several police officers and had said, "[A]lthough she may not know me, I
don't want her to hold it against me." Id. The Fifth Circuit indicated that the trial court
judge made "no specific credibility findings, but merely listened to the government's race-
neutral reasons and stated that 'I don't see any racial problem' with the jury." Id. The
Fifth Circuit found "no basis for reversal." Id.
57. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.300 (Michie 1999).
5& Id.
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beliefs of the defendant or the victim in reaching a verdict. 9 Second,
after a verdict has been rendered, all jurors must certify that they did not,
in fact, consider the race, national origin, sex, or religious beliefs of the
defendant or the victim in reaching their determinations and that their
determinations would have been the same regardless of those factors.
6
0
In spite of these statutes, federal juries have disproportionately
sentenced racial minorities, particularly African-American defendants, to
death. From 1995 to 2000, sixteen of twenty defendants sentenced to
death were racial minorities, thirteen of whom were African Americans.
61
In addition, between 1995 and 2000, federal juries recommended that
thirteen of twenty-five African-American defendants convicted of capital
murder be sentenced to death and that two of two Hispanic defendants
be sentenced to death, but that only four of eleven white defendants
convicted of capital murder be sentenced to death.62 The disparity in
sentencing is greater in federal cases than in individual states, leading
President Clinton, Attorney General Reno, and others to question the
fairness of the federal death penalty process.63
3. Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion
In the federal system, the prosecutor's discretion to seek the death
penalty has been limited by the executive branch. United States
Department of Justice policy provides that "bias based on characteristics
such as an individual's race [or] ethnicity must play no role in a United
States Attorney's decision to recommend the death penalty." 6  A U.S.
Attorney "must recommend to the Attorney General whether he or she
believes that the death penalty should be authorized" in a particular
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2000).
60. Id.
61. United States Department of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: A
Statistical Survey (1988-2000) (Sept. 12, 2000) at T-4 [hereinafter Federal Death Penalty
System Survey].
6Z Id.
63. Former President Clinton said that he was concerned about "the disturbing racial
composition" of the federal death penalty population and the geographic disparities,
"which raises the question of whether, even though there is a uniform law across the
country, what your prosecution is may turn solely on where you committed the crime."
Raymond Bonner & Marc Lacey, US. Plans Delay in First Execution in Four Decades,
N.Y. TIMES, July 7,2000, at Al. See also Marc Lacey & Raymond Bonner, Reno Troubled
by Death Penalty Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A17. Attorney General Reno
noted that she was "sorely troubled" by the Justice Department's data demonstrating
racial disparities in the federal system, and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder stated
that he was "both personally and professionally disturbed by the numbers." Id.
64. See Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at 2-3.
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case.' He or she must also submit to the Attorney General for review all
cases in which a defendant is charged with a capital-eligible offense,
regardless of whether the U.S. Attorney actually desires to seek the
death penalty in that case.6 Before submitting the case to the Attorney
General, the U.S. Attorney or his or her designee must meet with
defense counsel and "allow them to make [a] written and oral
presentation as to why the death penalty should not be sought in the
case." 67 Furthermore, many U.S. Attorneys employ committees of senior
prosecutors to review all capital-eligible cases; others appoint an internal
review committee when necessary.68
The U.S. Attorneys' submissions are considered by a committee of
senior attorneys at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.,
known as the Attorney General's Review Committee on Capital Cases
(Review Committee), which makes an independent recommendation to
the Attorney General.6 The Review Committee meets with defense
counsel before making its recommendation to the Attorney General, and
defense counsel is permitted to make an oral presentation to the
committee as to why the Attorney General should not authorize the U.S.
Attorney to seek the death penalty.7" The Attorney General then
receives the recommendations of the U.S. Attorney and the Review
Committee and reviews the U.S. Attorney's materials, including defense
counsel's submissions.7' The Attorney General concludes the process by
signing a letter, which either authorizes the filing of a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty or instructs the U.S. Attorney not to seek the
death penalty.72
This extensive review process has led to a lower percentage of
recommendations to seek the death penalty against black defendants.
73
There are additional facts, however, which indicate that the review
process has not been successful in eliminating racism in the decision-
making process. For example, federal prosecutors still possess a
tremendous amount of discretion. U.S. Attorneys can defer prosecution
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 10.
6& Id. at 10-11.
69. See id. at 18.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 23.
72. Id.
73. Id. at T-4.
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to state authorities." They have discretion not to charge defendants
"with a capital-eligible offense if they do not believe the charge could be
sustained,"75 and they can conclude a plea agreement with the
defendant.76 Undeniably, the majority of those charged with capital
offenses have been racial minorities.? Another example that illustrates
how the review process has failed to eliminate racism is that U.S.
Attorneys were almost twice as likely to recommend the death penalty
for black defendants when the victim was non-black, as compared to
situations in which the victim was black.78 These examples demonstrate
that the federal death penalty process is unfair.
Limiting prosecutorial discretion will not eliminate racism from the
decision to seek the death penalty because it is impossible to completely
limit prosecutorial discretion. Unfortunately, our experiences with
Batson, attempts to make jurors conscious of racism by instructing them
both before and after deliberations, and attempts to limit prosecutorial
discretion demonstrate that no amount of legislation will remove race as
a determinant in the death penalty process. This point will be discussed
further in Part III of the article.
B. Incompetent Counsel
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has said, "I have yet to see a death case
among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution
stay applications in which the defendant was well represented at trial."7
Another serious problem with the imposition of the death penalty is
that many defendants have been represented by substandard counsel. In
capital cases, it is not uncommon for defendants to be represented by
counsel insufficiently skilled in capital cases in particular or in criminal
law generally." Attorneys in capital cases are often underpaid and lack
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at T-4.
78. Between 1995 and 2000, U.S. Attorneys recommended the death penalty in
thirty-six percent of cases in which a black defendant killed a non-black victim. See Bob
Dart, Racial Disparity Seen as Federal Executions Resume, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 6,
2001, at 4A. A recommendation to seek the death penalty where a black defendant killed
a black victim was made in twenty percent of the cases. Id.
79. Oklahoma Governor Commutes Death Case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 2001, at 8.
80. See, e.g., Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
state trial court assigned a capital case to a lawyer who had passed the bar examination
only a few months earlier); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 746 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that
the defendant's lawyer had been a member of the bar for only six months); Bell v.
Watkins, 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that the lawyer appointed in the capital case
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the resources to conduct adequate investigations.8 The problem stems in
large part from the Supreme Court's failure to articulate minimum
standards for determining effective lawyering in criminal cases and in the
Court's adoption of an extremely high legal standard for establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington,"' the Court
held that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that he was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that
this performance prejudiced the defense. 3
As a result of Strickland, it has been extremely difficult for defendants
to establish that the representation they received was constitutionally
ineffective. Courts have held that lawyers who: 1) failed to investigate
potentially exculpatory evidence; 84 2) represented both the victim and the
defendant;"' 3) used racial slurs in referring to their clients;"" 4) filed
appellate briefs consisting of one page of argument;"' 5) were intoxicated
during trial;'s and 6) failed to present mitigating evidence during the
sentencing phase 9 did not necessarily render constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel. One of the most absurd holdings occurred in
Burdine v. Johnson.9° In Burdine, the defendant alleged and the courtfound that trial counsel slept during portions of defendant's capital
had never finished a criminal trial of any kind); Smith v. State, 581 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1990) (noting that defense counsel asked for extra time between the guilt and
sentencing phases of a capital case in order to read the state death penalty statute for the
first time); Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989) (noting that a third-year law
student was allowed to handle most of a capital trial).
81. See Kenneth Williams, The Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 677, 711 n.237 (2000).
82. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
83. See id. at 687-88, 694.
84. Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 1996) (vacating the lower court's
decision on procedural grounds).
85. Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. granted in part 532 U.S.
970 (2001), affd 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002).
86. See Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (reproducing
counsel's opening statements referring to the defendant as a "nigger"); Ex parte Guzmon,
730 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that the defendant was "afforded
ineffective assistance of counsel" at trial because his counsel referred to the defendant as
an unpredictable and irresponsible "wet-back").
87. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1860-61 n.154 (1994).
88. See People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746, 785-88 (1986) (rejecting the defendant's
assertion that counsel's performance was deficient).
89. See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989).
90. 231 F.3d 950 (5th Cir. 2000), reh'g granted en banc, vacated by 234 F.3d 1339 (5th
Cir. 2000).
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murder trial.9 A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
however, held that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective
because it was "impossible to determine - instead only to speculate - that
counsel's sleeping was at a critical stage of the trial."
2
The American Bar Association and several states have recognized the
problem and have attempted to address it.93 They have recommended
that minimum standards be adopted to govern the appointment of
counsel in capital cases, that appointments be made by a neutral
authority, and that counsel in capital cases be adequately compensated
and provided with the support necessary to conduct investigations and
represent their client.94 In addition, Professor James S. Liebman of
Columbia Law School has suggested that in order to address the problem
of imbalance of resources between prosecutors and defense counsel in
capital cases, the state post-conviction proceeding should be eliminated.
According to Professor Liebman:
The best way to improve the accuracy of capital verdicts and the
efficiency of the capital review process is to use resources now
devoted to largely ineffectual state collateral review to improve
the adversarial balance at the more crucial trial phase of capital
cases. By appointing well-qualified defense attorneys at the
outset of the case, and by giving them the financial support
needed so they can reliably test the state's case, present
available exculpatory and extenuating evidence, and object to
procedures that compromise the reliability of the trial, states
will go much further than state post-conviction proceedings
currently do towards assuring the accuracy and procedural
regularity of capital trials.95
It is clear that by implementing some of the proposals suggested above,
better qualified counsel would be appointed in capital cases, which would
reduce some of the serious errors that occur in these cases. However,
91. Id. at 952.
92- Id. at 964.
93. See generally American Bar Association, Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities, Death Without Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of the
Death Penalty in the United States (June 2001) [hereinafter Death Without Justice]
(recommending standards to counter injustice in the administration of the death penalty).
The Supreme Court of Illinois also imposed new standards for defense counsel and
require that judges undergo more frequent training about capital case law. See ILL. S. Cr.
R. 416, available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/ArtIV/ ArtIV.htm#
416.
94. Death Without Justice, supra note 93, at 5-15.
95. James S. Liebman, Realigning the Trial Level Incentives for Generating Reliable
Death Sentences, available at http://www.acs.ohio-state.edu/units/law/LawJoumal/liebman
sympab.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
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even if these proposals are implemented, the problems that have become
common in capital cases will be minimized, not eliminated. For instance,
in Burdine v. Johnson, the defendant was represented by counsel who
was highly experienced and who would have met the standards had they
been implemented at the time.96 Similarly, in the high profile case of
Gary Graham, the Texas death row inmate executed after his trial
attorney failed to conduct an investigation into the possibility of another
assailant, Mr. Graham was also represented by a highly experienced
lawyer.7 Just as there are incompetent lawyers who manage to graduate
from law school and pass the bar examination, there will be incompetent
lawyers who satisfy whatever standards may be adopted. In addition, the
problem of racism in the imposition of the death penalty will not be
eliminated simply by adopting minimum standards for the appointment
of counsel, as will be discussed in detail later. Despite these
shortcomings, however, there should be minimum standards all attorneys
must satisfy before being appointed to these highly complex cases.
C. DNA Testing
Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, contains "genetic code and is often
present at crime scenes, either in tissue or bodily fluids." 98 It has been
hailed as "the most significant advance in forensic science since the
advent of fingerprinting in the early 1900s." ' DNA tests have exonerated
at least ten death-row inmates."" As a result of the significant impact
DNA evidence has already had on the criminal justice system, several
states have implemented DNA testing in capital murder cases, and
similar legislation has been proposed by other states and by the federal
government. 1" The proposed federal legislation provides for some type
of post-conviction testing when an inmate claims to be innocent, requires
that DNA evidence be preserved as long as an inmate is in custody, and
forces states to bear the costs of the testing.12
Although some prosecutors oppose offering DNA testing to any
prisoner who claims that it will prove his or her innocence on the grounds
96. Burdine was represented by Joe Frank Cannon whose career is detailed in Paul
Barrett, On the Defense, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,1994, at A6.
97. See Sara Rimer & Raymond Bonner, Texas Lawyer's Death Row Record a
Concern, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at 1.
98. Mike Doming, Senator To Propose Death Row Safeguards, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10,
2000, at Al.
99. Mark Hansen, The Great Detective, 87 A.B.A. J. 36, 38 (2001).
100. Id. at 43-44.
101. Id. at 40.
102 See Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S.486, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001).
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that it is expensive and time consuming, 1°3 the legislation is wise and
should be universally adopted. It is extremely important, particularly in
capital cases, to identify the actual perpetrator of a crime. The
prosecutor's objections can be met by mandating DNA tests only in cases
where physical evidence exists.
However, there is a major problem that the DNA testing legislation
does not address: in most states and in federal court, an inmate is
extremely restricted in his or her ability both to reopen a case following
conviction and to have DNA evidence considered. For instance, in 1996,
Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
which precludes the introduction of new evidence unless it "could not
have been previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence."1' Similarly, in Texas, which recently enacted DNA testing
legislation,' °5 courts are precluded from considering the merits of a new
claim unless it has not been and could not have been presented
previously.1 6 In order for DNA testing legislation to truly be effective,
Congress and the states must amend their laws to permit the introduction
of DNA or any new evidence indicating innocence in post-conviction
proceedings.
Finally, although the enactment of DNA testing legislation is
important, its potential impact is often overstated. 17 Such legislation will
not "fix" the death penalty since many cases do not involve physical
evidence. To date, of the one hundred and two inmates released from
death row after evidence of their innocence was accepted, only twelve
involved DNA evidence.1 8 As Professor Barry Scheck has said, "The
real lesson to be learned from all of this is not that DNA can free a lot of
innocent people from prison, which it can, but how they got there and
what we can do to prevent it from happening again. ' '
103. See Mark Hansen, DNA Reviews Afoot, 87 A.B.A. J. 40 (2001).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2001).
105. See DNA Bill Approved, Sent On to Governor, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2001, at
Al.
106. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.071, § 5 (Supp. 2002).
107. See John B. Wefing, Wishful Thinking by Ronald J. Tabak: Why DNA Evidence
Will Not Lead to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 33 CONN. L. REv. 861, 862 (2001)
(arguing that "DNA evidence will in fact lead to greater support for the death penalty in
the long run").
108l See Death Penalty Information Center, Cases of Innocence 1973-Present, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoccases.html (last modified Aug. 5,2002).
109. See Hansen, supra note 99, at 77.
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D. Eyewitness Testimony
The fallibility of eyewitness testimony has been demonstrated through
both empirical data and common experience." For example, the Center
on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of Law
analyzed seventy cases in which eighty-four men and two women had
been sentenced to death but were later exonerated."' The Center found
the following:
* Of the 86 legally exonerated persons, eyewitness
testimony played a role in the convictions of 46 - 53.5%.
* Eyewitness testimony was the only evidence against 33
defendants - 38.4%.
* Only one eyewitness testified in 32 of the 46 defendants'
cases - 69.6% - and multiple eyewitnesses testified in the
other 14 - 30.4%.
* The eyewitnesses were strangers to 19 of the defendants
- 41.3% and were non-accomplice acquaintances of 9 -
19.6%.
* Witnesses who presented themselves as combination
accomplice-eyewitnesses testified against 15 of the
defendants - 32.6% of the 46 - and all of these witnesses
had incentives to testify, ranging from full immunity to
leniency in sentencing.
* In five cases - each involving a single, non-accomplice
eyewitness - the witness received consideration from the
prosecution in a pending case.
* In four cases - each also involving a single, non-
accomplice eyewitness - the apparently false testimony
110. "The scientific validity of the studies confirming the many weaknesses of
eyewitness identification cannot be seriously questioned at this point." United States v.
Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Abney, Expert Testimony and
Eyewitness Identification, 91 CASE & COMMENT 26, 29 (1986)). In Moore, the Fifth
Circuit noted:
[Ilt is commonly believed that the accuracy of a witness' recollection increases
with the certainty of the witness. In fact, the data reveal no correlation between
witness certainty and accuracy. Similarly, it is commonly believed that witnesses
remember better when they are under stress. The data indicate that the opposite
is true. The studies also show that a group consensus among witnesses as to an
alleged criminal's identity is far more likely to be inaccurate than is an individual
identification. This is because of the effect of the 'feedback factor,' which serves
to reinforce mistaken identifications.
Id. at 1312.
111. Rob Warden, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Eyewitness Study, How Mistaken
and Perjured Eyewitness Identification Testimony Put 46 Innocent Americans on Death
Row (May 2, 2001), at http://www.law.nwu.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/causes.htm.
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appeared to have been motivated by a grudge; in one
case, the defendant and the purported eyewitness were
in a love triangle....
* The average (mean) time between the arrest of the defendant
and his or her exoneration in the eyewitness cases was 95
months - just short of 12 years.112
Another powerful example of the fallacy of eyewitness testimony was
provided by a rape victim in the New York Times:
In 1984 1 was a 22-year-old college student with a grade point
average of 4.0, and I really wanted to do something with my life.
One night someone broke into my apartment, put a knife to my
throat and raped me.
During my ordeal, some of my determination took an urgent
new direction. I studied every single detail on the rapist's face.
I looked at his hairline; I looked for scars, for tattoos, for
anything that would help me identify him. When and if I
survived the attack, I was going to make sure that he was put in
prison and he was going to rot.
When I went to the police department later that day, I
worked on a composite sketch to the very best of my ability. I
looked through hundreds of noses and eyes and eyebrows and
hairlines and nostrils and lips. Several days later, looking at a
series of police photos, I identified my attacker. I knew this was
the man. I was completely confident. I was sure.
I picked the same man in a lineup. Again, I was sure. I knew
it. ...
When the case went to trial in 1986, I stood up on the stand,
put my hand on the Bible and swore to tell the truth. Based on
my testimony, Ronald Junior Cotton was sentenced to prison
for life. It was the happiest day of my life because I could begin
to put it all behind me.
In 1987, the case was retried because an appellate court had
overturned Ronald Cotton's conviction. During a pretrial
hearing, I learned that another man had supposedly claimed to
be my attacker and was bragging about it in the same prison
wing where Ronald Cotton was being held. This man, Bobby
Poole, was brought into court, and I was asked, "Ms.
Thompson, have you ever seen this man?"
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In 1995, 11 years after I had first identified Ronald Cotton, I
was asked to provide a blood sample so that DNA tests could
be run on evidence from the rape....
I will never forget the day I learned about the DNA results. I
was standing in my kitchen when the detective and the district
attorney visited. They were good and decent people who were
trying to do their jobs - - as I had done mine, as anyone would
try to do the right thing. They told me: "Ronald Cotton didn't
rape you. It was Bobby Poole."
The man I was so sure I had never seen in my life was the
man who was inches from my throat, who raped me, who hurt
me, who took my spirit away, who robbed me of my soul. And
the man I had identified so emphatically on so many occasions
was absolutely innocent.
Ronald Cotton was released from prison after serving 11
years. Bobby Poole pleaded guilty to raping me."3
Despite its unreliability, juries often give eyewitness testimony
considerable weight. What then can be done to minimize the impact of
eyewitness testimony? One potential solution is that in any capital case
in which eyewitness testimony will be offered, an expert should be
routinely appointed by the court to testify as to the limitations of
eyewitness testimony. This proposal would not require any new
enactment. The current Federal Rules of Evidence" 4 and a number of
states"5 explicitly permit the appointment of experts upon the motion of
the court or of any party. More frequent use of court-appointed experts
might assist lay juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony and weighing it
properly. " 6
E. Jailhouse Informants
Unreliable jailhouse informant testimony is frequently a factor in
capital convictions. For instance, the Chicago Tribune reported that
jailhouse informant testimony had been a factor in at least 46 out of 295
capital convictions since the reinstatement of the death penalty in
113. Jennifer Thompson, I Was Certain, but I Was Wrong,' N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000,
at D15 (emphasis added).
114. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
115. See, e.g., 17A ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706 (2002); MD. CODE ANN. EVID. § 5-
706 (2002); CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (1986).
116. Judicial use of court-appointed experts is rare. See generally Tahirih V. Lee,
Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance.- A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 480 (1980) (arguing for an increased
reliance on court-appointed experts).
[Vol. 51:1011196
The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?
Illinois. 17 The newspaper also reported that in at least half of the cases
that relied on jailhouse informants, the informant's testimony played a
crucial role in obtaining convictions.' 18  In addition, Northwestern
University's Center on Wrongful Convictions found that jailhouse
informant testimony was a significant factor in the wrongful conviction of
capital defendants. 9
A major problem with informant testimony is that it is inherently
unreliable. Although it is usually offered into evidence as a confession
against the defendant, it has none of the safeguards that a similar
confession to the police would have. n Furthermore, the individuals
presenting the testimony are inmates who have received a deal or who
hope to receive a deal from the state in exchange for their testimony.
In one case, Rolando Cruz was sentenced to death for the kidnaping,
rape, and murder of Jeanine Nicarico. 2' The evidence against him was
largely testimonial, including the testimony of several jailhouse
informants.' Mr. Cruz's conviction was later reversed on appeal.'2
In Rolando Cruz's case, one jailhouse informant was awaiting re-
sentencing when he testified against Cruz. After the testimony was
presented and Cruz was sentenced to death, the prosecutor testified on
behalf of the informant, Turner, at his re-sentencing hearing.'2' On cross-
examination, the prosecutor admitted that "before testifying in the Cruz
case, [Turner] wanted to make certain that [the prosecutor] would testify
on [Turner's] behalf at [Turner's] re-sentencing hearing."' 26 Another
jailhouse informant in the Cruz case was accused of telling other death
row inmates "that he knew of a way to 'get time' (obtain a natural life
sentence) by finding out some facts about a case and then fabricating
additional information.', 27 These witnesses, as is usually the case with
117. See Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Inside Informant, CHi. TRIB., Nov. 16,
1999, at 1.
118. Id.
119. See Warden, supra note 111.
120. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-65 (1966) (holding that prior to
any questioning of a suspect in police custody, the person must be warned that he has the
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)(reaffirming Miranda).
121. Illinois v. Cruz, 643 N.E. 2d 636, 639 (1994).
122. Id. at 640.
123. Id. at 667.
124. See id. at 644.
125. Id.
126. Id. (second alteration added).
127. Id. at 643.
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jailhouse informants, had much to gain and almost nothing to lose by
fabricating testimony against Cruz.
Because of these problems, jailhouse informant testimony should
undergo thorough scrutiny before it is admitted into evidence. First, the
defendant should have an opportunity to depose the witness, as is
presently the case in Illinois.' 8 Second, a pretrial hearing should be held
before any informant testimony is admitted in order to afford the trial
judge an opportunity to assess its reliability. Finally, informant
testimony should never be admitted when it is the primary evidence
against a defendant and should rarely be admitted in other instances.
Rules of evidence already prohibit the admission of evidence that is
highly prejudicial, unreliable, and provides minimal probative value, 29
and jailhouse informant testimony is such evidence. At best, it merely
corroborates evidence presented at trial, but given the witness' strong
incentive to fabricate, it is inherently suspect and unreliable and should
therefore be barred from most capital trials.
F. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct is a systemic problem in capital cases. One
study found that prosecutorial misconduct accounted for more reversals
of capital cases than any other error except ineffective assistance of
counsel.' 3 Another study of capital cases in Ohio found that "[s]ome
ethical issue involving the prosecutor has arisen in 14 of the 48 cases
where the death penalty was successfully sought."'' Northwestern
University's Center on Wrongful Convictions' study of wrongfully
convicted capital defendants found that prosecutorial misconduct was
one of the most significant factors leading to conviction in seven
defendants' cases. 32 Finally, a Chicago Tribune investigation found
128. See People v. Bakalis, 752 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (11. 2001).
129. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
130. See James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1839, 1850 (2000) (finding that one of the most common errors at
the state post-conviction stage is "prosecutorial suppression of evidence that the
defendant is innocent or does not deserve the death penalty," which accounts for sixteen
percent of state post-conviction reversals).
131. Edward C. Brewer, 1II, Let's Play Jeopardy: Where the Question Comes After the
Answer for Stopping Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 28 N. KY. L. REV.
34, 36 (2001).
132. See Warden, supra note 111.
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hundreds of homicide cases in which the prosecutors concealed or
fabricated evidence.
133
What, if anything, can be done to stop prosecutorial misconduct from
occurring so frequently? Some suggestions are to require full discovery,
to require identification of exculpatory evidence, to lower the standard
for reversing convictions in cases of prosecutorial misconduct, to impose
severe discipline, and to eliminate absolute immunity.'
In regard to requiring full discovery, full discovery is now routine in
civil cases.3 It should also be mandated in criminal cases, particularly
capital cases. Presently, prosecutors are only required in most states to
turn over exculpatory evidence to the defendant.' 36
If discovery is mandated, it will also be necessary to mandate that
prosecutors identify exculpatory evidence and evidence favorable to the
defendant. Otherwise, there is a danger that favorable evidence may be
buried among other voluminous material.
In addition, the standard for reversing convictions in cases of
prosecutorial misconduct should be lowered. Presently, convictions are
only reversed if prosecutorial misconduct had a prejudicial effect on the
outcome of the case. 13  Thus, the law provides prosecutors with an
incentive to commit misconduct because, even if their misdeeds are
133. See generally Kenneth Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: How
Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win (pts. 1-5), CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10-14, 1999.
134. For other suggestions, see Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:
Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOwA L. REv. 393, 462-63 (2001)
(suggesting the adoption of a Public Information Department in all prosecution offices to
"enhance public knowledge of the prosecutorial function" and the creation of Prosecution
Review Board "to review complaints and conduct random reviews of prosecution
decisions to deter misconduct and arbitrary decision making")
135. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
136. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87-88 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held:
[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution ....
... A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if
made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a
trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of
an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice.
Id. The courts have been reluctant to permit any further discovery by defendants. See,
e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that a defendant was not
entitled to discovery on a claim that the prosecuting attorney singled him out for
persecution on the basis of his race).
137. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,579-80 (1986).
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discovered, the likelihood of reversal is minimal.'38 Convictions should
be reversed whenever favorable evidence is intentionally withheld from
the defendant, regardless of the withheld evidence's likely impact on the
verdict. Prosecutors would then have strong incentives to turn over
potentially exculpatory evidence.
Furthermore, prosecutors must be severely disciplined for their
misconduct. Presently, however, that is not the case. 39 For instance,
Professor Edward Brewer III "was unable to find any published
decisions of disciplinary action for prosecutorial misconduct in death-
penalty cases""'' despite the frequency at which it occurs. Prosecutors
should be named in court opinions finding prosecutorial misconduct and
judges should automatically refer their names to state bar disciplinary
committees. Disciplinary committees should severely sanction
prosecutors for misconduct to send the message that such behavior will
not be tolerated.
Moreover, reforms should abolish prosecutors' absolute immunity
from civil liability for acts "intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process.' 4' This absolute immunity exists because of the
"concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a
deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the
possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the
independence of judgment required by his public trust.' 42
However, prosecutors should be civilly liable for intentional
misconduct in capital cases. The only more effective deterrent is making
prosecutors criminally liable, but given the difficulties and awkwardness
of prosecuting prosecutors for misconduct, subjecting them to civil
liability is the next best alternative 4' There are obvious objections to
138. For a discussion of how the harmless error rule encourages prosecutorial
misconduct, see Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393,
424-32 (1992).
139. For a discussion of the lack of professional discipline of prosecutors, see
Gershman, supra note 138, at 443-48 and Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 703-08
(1987).
140. Brewer, supra note 131, at 36.
141. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,430 (1976).
142. Id. at 423.
143. See Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Historic Case Sent Ripples Through Legal
Community, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1999, at Al. One of the most aggressive efforts ever to
hold prosecutors criminally accountable occurred in DuPage County, Illinois. Following
the release of a wrongfully convicted capital defendant, charges were brought against
three prosecutors for conspiring to frame the defendant and send him to death row. See
Maurice Possley & Ted Gregory, DuPage 5 Win Acquittal, Jurors Join Courtroom
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this proposal, such as the objections articulated by the Supreme Court in
Imbler: subjecting prosecutors to civil suits will take them away from
their duties and will constrain decision-making. This is of minimal
concern, however, because the number of capital cases is small, and a
civil suit would only occur after a finding of misconduct in the criminal
proceeding.4 The finding in the criminal proceeding need not be
relitigated in the civil proceeding; in fact, rules of preclusion will usually
Celebrations After Verdicts, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1999. Each defendant was exonerated,
either by the trial judge before the case reached the jury or by the jury. Id. As an
indication of how difficult it is to obtain a conviction against prosecutors, the Chicago
Tribune reported that the jurors bonded with the prosecutor-defendants:
Almost all of [the jurors] were either out of the courtroom or filing through
the door when Knight [a defendant] walked over from his defense table and
extended his hand to a woman juror. As they shook hands, Knight thanked her.
Other jurors turned around and Knight extended his hand again.
It happened just that simply. Suddenly, all the jurors were filing back into
the courtroom. All the other defendants were on their feet, some of them
hugging wives and children. And they began hugging the jurors, some of them --
jurors and family members alike -- had tears in their eyes. High-fives were
exchanged.
Defense lawyers and prosecutors gaped, as did spectators. The scene lasted
more than 10 minutes and courtroom veterans of more than 30 years said such a
celebration between jurors and defendants was unprecedented....
But what happened later that night was stunning -- the jurors went to a
nearby restaurant and tavern to join the defendants, their families and their
lawyers in celebration.
Maurice Possley, Perspective, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1999, at C1. Furthermore, the Chicago
Tribune reported that the prosecutors in DuPage also bonded with the defendants.
As is typical in many high profile criminal cases, a large number of assistant
state's attorneys came to the courtroom to hear the verdicts. But these DuPage
prosecutors were not there to support Special Prosecutor William Kunkle and his
team. They came to support the defendants and they, too, joined in the cheers
and applause for the defendants.
Id.
144. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. In Imbler, the Court expressed its concern with any
holding that might subject prosecutors to civil liability on the ground that the liability of a
prosecutor for unconstitutional behavior might induce a federal court in a habeas corpus
proceeding to deny a valid constitutional claim in order to protect the prosecutor. See id.
However, Justice White responded that "these adverse consequences are present with
respect to suits against policemen, school teachers, and other executives, and have never
before been thought sufficient to immunize an official absolutely no matter how
outrageous his conduct. Indeed, these reasons are present with respect to suits against all
state officials .... Id. at 436 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice White
further noted:
We simply rely on the ability of federal judges correctly to apply the law to the
facts with the knowledge that the overturning of a conviction on constitutional
grounds hardly dooms the official in question to payment of a damage award in
light of the qualified immunity which he possesses....
Id. at 436 n.3.
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bar relitigation of the issue.'45 Such preclusion also means that
prosecutors will not be required to expend an inordinate amount of time
defending themselves. Additionally, reasonable prosecutorial decision-
making will not be affected by eliminating absolute immunity.
Prosecutors will still be vested with qualified immunity for most of their
decisions.' 46 Finally, while there is a possible concern that the elimination
of absolute immunity might constrain prosecutorial decision-making, the
decision to seek the death penalty should be made only after thoughtful
deliberation and thus should be constrained. Justice White poignantly
stated, "[T]he judicial process would be protected-and indeed its
integrity enhanced-by denial of immunity to prosecutors who engage in
unconstitutional conduct."'47
G. Other Reforms
In order to minimize the problem of coerced confessions,'
interrogation of suspects should be videotaped.' 4 In addition, because
police lineups are often suggestive, sequential lineups should be
utilized.i Furthermore, eligibility for the death penalty should be
limited. The United States violates international law by executing
145. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (noting that collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of factual issues).
146. Public officials who have not been granted absolute immunity are entitled to
qualified immunity. "Under 'qualified immunity,' government officials are not subject to
damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions when 'their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."' RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS §
14.29, at 14-35 (3d ed. 1994)(footnote omitted).
147. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 442.
148. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 92 (2000) ("Among DNA
exonerations studied by the Innocence Project, 23 percent of the convictions were based
on false confessions or admissions.").
149. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory
Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solttion to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337 (2001); Wefing, supra note 107, at 887 (suggesting that in addition to
videotaping confessions, suspects should not be questioned without counsel present and
that questioning "of persons who are retarded or who have severe emotional problems"
should be prohibited).
150. See, e.g., Gina Kolata & Iver Peterson, New Jersey Is Trying New Way for Witness
To Say "It's Him," N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001. During sequential lineups, individuals will
be presented to victims and other eyewitnesses one at a time. See id. At present,
individuals are presented all at the same time, allowing comparisons, contrasts, and re-
studying of suspects. Id. The problem with the present approach is that eyewitnesses
often choose the individual in a lineup who most closely resembles the perpetrator and not
necessarily the perpetrator himself.
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juveniles,"' and few nations execute the mentally retarded. 152 Both of
these practices should cease in the United States as well. Only those
defendants who kill or intended to kill should be eligible for the death
penalty."' Finally, jurors should be given the option of sentencing
defendants to life without parole.I 4
III. WHY ALL THE REFORMS STILL WILL NOT "FIX" THE PROBLEM:
RACISM
The preceding section discussed major problems in the administration
of the death penalty and proposed some solutions. However, even in the
unlikely event that every possible reform is implemented, the death
penalty will still be fraught with problems. This section will discuss
reasons that explain why the death penalty is not "fixable."
As discussed earlier, there is an abundance of evidence to indicate that
the death penalty is presently administered in a racially discriminatory
manner. The death penalty will never be fair and thus will never gain
acceptance by a significant segment of the community. One major
challenge for proponents of the death penalty is to find a way to
administer it in a manner in which race is not a key determinant of who is
sentenced to death and who is not. Is this possible? Earlier, this article
indicated that attempts have been made to eliminate racism in the
imposition of the death penalty and that these attempts have proven
unsuccessful. However, most of these reforms have been implemented
piecemeal. What if most, if not all, of the proposed reforms are
implemented? Would this ensure a racially neutral death penalty?
151. Article 6, Section 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on "persons below eighteen years of age."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. For
a discussion of whether the United States imposes capital punishment in compliance with
international law, see Beverly McQueary Smith, The Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the United States of America: Does It Comply with International Norms?, 15 TOURo L.
REv. 529, 539-40 (1999).
152. Only Kyrgyzstan is known regularly to execute people with mental retardation.
See Harold Hongju Koh, A Dismal Record on Executing the Retarded, N.Y. TIMES, June
14, 2001, at A33.
153. At present, those who kill, those who intend to kill, and those who were major
participants in a felony who acted with "reckless indifference to human life" can be
executed. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
154. Studies have shown that jurors are less likely to impose the death penalty if given
the option of life without parole. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and
Death: Juror Race, Religion and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. OF LEGAL STUD.
277 (2001) (finding that "the more time a juror believes the defendant will remain in
prison, the more likely he is to vote for life; the less time, the more likely he is to vote for
death").
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While most of the proposed reforms are well-intentioned'55 and should be
implemented as long as capital punishment exists, they will not eliminate
race from infecting the process. Minorities, particularly African
Americans, will continue to be sentenced to death disproportionately,
and those who kill whites will continue to be sentenced to death at a
higher rate than killers of minorities. This will continue to be the case, as
indicated by: 1) our experience with the federal death penalty, 2) the
military's death penalty process, 3) jurors continued discrimination in
these cases, and 4) evidence of racism in the broader society.
A. The Federal Death Penalty
Most of the reforms that have been proposed have been implemented
at the federal level. As a result, "the federal system does not appear to
be subject to many of the ills that may plague some state systems.' ' 56 For
example, indigent capital defendants are entitled to the appointment of
two experienced, adequately paid attorneys to represent them at trial, on
direct appeal, and during the collateral review of their cases. 57  As
discussed in Part II, the discretion of federal prosecutors is severely
limited, 58 and there are measures to ensure that jurors do not consider
race during their deliberations.5 9 In addition, federal capital trials are
presided over by life-tenured judges. At the sentencing phase, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the capital offense with a certain level of intent1
60
155. See Jim Yardley, Texas Set To Shift in Wake of Furor on the Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2001, at Al (noting that while the Texas legislature instituted several
criminal justice reforms during its 2001 session, the main motivation appears to have been
a desire to improve its national image after the exposure of the state's flawed system
during then-Governor George W. Bush's presidential campaign); Bruce Hight, Crime Bills
Stress Justice, Not Toughness, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Apr. 30, 2001, at Al; Steve Mills,
Texas Revisits Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 2001, at C1.
156. Rory K. Little, Why a Federal Death Penalty Moratorium, 33 CONN. L. REV. 791,
795 (2001).
157. Upon the request of an indigent capital defendant, a federal judge must appoint
two attorneys to represent the defendant and make available sufficient funds for
reasonable investigative and expert services. The attorneys appointed to represent an
indigent defendant must have the "background, knowledge, or experience [that] would
otherwise enable him or her to properly represent the defendant, with due consideration
to the seriousness of the possible penalty and to the unique and complex nature of the
litigation." 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(7) (2000). Furthermore, at least one of the defense
attorneys must be "learned in the law applicable to capital cases." 18 U.S.C. § 3005
(2000).
158. See Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at 2-3.
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (1994).
160. See Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at 28.
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Furthermore, the prosecution must prove any aggravating factors beyond
a reasonable doubt and must prove at least one from a list of specific
factors. 6' The defendant need only prove mitigating factors by a
preponderance of the evidence, and each juror can make an individual
decision as to which factors have been proven. 62 A jury verdict to
sentence a defendant to death must be unanimous.' 6 Moreover, federal
law prohibits the execution of juveniles,' 6 the mentally retarded, 65 and
pregnant women.' 6 Finally, in reviewing capital cases, appellate courts
must, in addition to determining the points of error raised by the
defendant, determine "whether the sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and
whether the evidence supports the special finding of the existence of an
aggravating factor.... ,,67
Despite these safeguards designed to ensure that the death penalty is
administered fairly and in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner,
pervasive racial and other disparities exist in the implementation of the
federal death penalty. According to the Justice Department's own study,
the federal death row population consists primarily of minorities,
particularly African Americans. The study found that from 1995 to
2000, ten of fourteen death row inmates were African-American. 69
Furthermore, in seventy-five percent of the cases in which a federal
161. The statutory list of aggravating factors includes: killing multiple victims;
committing the capital offense against particularly vulnerable victims or high-level public
officials; paying someone else to commit the murder; committing the murder for pecuniary
gain; committing the murder while committing other serious crimes; causing a grave risk of
death to persons other than the actual victims; committing the offense in a particularly
heinous manner; engaging in substantial planning or premeditation in committing the
murder; or having previous convictions for other serious offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §
3592(b)-(d) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 848(n) (2000).
162. The mitigating factors enumerated by statute are impaired capacity, duress, minor
participation, equally culpable defendants who will not be punished by death, lack of a
prior criminal record, mental or emotional disturbance, and consent by the victim. See 18
U.S.C. § 3592 (2000). See also 21 U.S.C. § 848(m) (2000).
163. See Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at 29. But see Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 304 n.1 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme
Court permitted the execution of an inmate, notwithstanding a Florida's jury's 10-2
recommendation of a life sentence. Id.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (2000). The statute mandates that "no person may be
sentenced to death who was less than 18 years of age at the time of the offense." Id.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2000).
166. 18 U.S.C. §3596(b) (2000). ("A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a
woman while she is pregnant.").
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c) (2000).
168. See Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at T-4.
169. See id.
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prosecutor sought the death penalty during the same time period, the
defendant was a member of a minority group, and in more than half of
the cases, an African American.7 ' Federal prosecutors are still almost
twice as likely to reach a plea agreement with a white defendant than
with a black or Hispanic defendant. 7 ' Finally, black defendants who are
convicted of killing whites are significantly more likely to be sentenced to
death than black defendants convicted of killing other blacks.'72
These disturbing statistics were produced as a result of a Justice
Department study. As a result, the Justice Department conducted a
further study to determine whether these statistics were proof of racial
and ethnic bias in the administration of the federal death penalty.'73 Not
surprisingly, the Justice Department concluded that there is "no evidence
of racial bias in the administration of the federal death penalty."'7 4 The
Department provided primarily three explanations for its conclusion.
[First,] the proportion of minority defendants in federal capital
cases exceeds the proportion of minority individuals in the
general population. The information gathered by the
Department indicates that the cause of this disproportion is not
racial or ethnic bias, but the representation of minorities in the
pool of potential federal capital cases. A factor of particular
importance is the focus of federal enforcement efforts on drug
trafficking enterprises and related criminal violence.... In areas
where large-scale, organized drug trafficking is largely carried
out by gangs whose membership is drawn from minority groups,
the active federal role in investigating and prosecuting these
crimes results in a high proportion of minority defendants in
federal cases, including a high proportion of minority
defendants in potential capital cases arising from the lethal
violence associated with the drug trade.'
Second, recommendations and decisions to seek the death penalty
were less likely at each stage of the process for black and Hispanic
defendants than for white defendants. The report indicated that, "[i]n
170. See Raymond Bonner & Marc Lacey, Pervasive Disparities Found in the Federal
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,2000, at A18.
171. See Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at 31-32.
172. See Bob Dart, Racial Disparity Seen As Federal Executions Resume, ATLANTA J.
CONST., May 6,2001, at 4A.
173. See The Department of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary
Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review, June 6, 2001, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm [hereinafter Federal Death
Penalty System. Revised Protocols].
174. See Mr. Ashcroft's Skimpy Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2001, at D14.
175. Federal Death Penalty System" Revised Protocols, supra note 173.
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the cases considered by the Attorney General, the Attorney General
approved seeking the death penalty for 38% of white defendants, 25% of
black defendants, and 20% of the Hispanic defendants." '176
Finally, as the Department of Justice explained, "[i]t takes two to
make a plea agreement. Inferring bias from disparities in such
agreements would not be justified unless non-invidious causes could be
excluded, including possible differences in the inclination of defendants
from different groups to seek or accept plea agreements.'77
The Justice Department's explanations are unconvincing and continue
to adhere to the view that race has always been and will continue to be a
factor in the capital sentencing decision. Thus, the Department's
response should be viewed with suspicion. Both the Clinton'78 and
Bush 79 administrations were strong supporters of capital punishment. As
a result, the Department was unlikely to conclude that the death penalty
was infected with racial bias. It would not be politically or morally
possible to reach such a conclusion and then continue with the pending
executions. At a minimum, such a conclusion would have mandated a
moratorium and further study, actions to which both administrations
were opposed, even before the Justice Department study was
completed.' 8
The Department's study has several major flaws. First, the
Department's study makes no mention of cases not submitted to the
review process. As discussed in Part II, U.S. Attorneys are not required
176. Id.
177. Id.
1_78. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH? 100-01
(2000). Former President Clinton was such a strong supporter of capital punishment that
during his 1992 campaign for president, he left the campaign trail to return home and
oversee the execution of Ricky Ray Rector. Id. Rector was so mentally impaired that
when he was taken from his cell to be executed, he asked the prison guards to save the
piece of pecan pie left on his tray for when he returned. Id. He also helped the
executioners find a vein for his lethal injection. Id. For a further discussion of Clinton's
views on capital punishment, see GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, ALL Too HUMAN 62-64
(1999).
179. As governor of Texas, George W. Bush presided over 152 executions. See Tony
Allen & Mills Washington, Bush Faces Challenge on Death Row, TIMES (London), Mar. 4,
2001.
180. See Dan Eggen, New Administration Casts Doubt on Halting Federal Executions,
WASH. POST, May 10, 2001, at All. When asked about a moratorium, Attorney General
John Ashcroft said: "When we have people who have committed heinous crimes, and
there's no question about their guilt, I don't know any reason to suspend the imposition of
an appropriate penalty." Id. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, while acknowledging
that she was troubled over the racial disparities in death sentencing, said that she saw no
need for a moratorium. Id.
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to submit for review all potentially capital-eligible defendants. 8 ' U.S.
Attorneys have discretion to defer cases to state authorities, conclude
plea agreements, and not charge defendants with capital offenses if they
do not believe the charges could be sustained." 2 Only if a U.S. Attorney
decides to charge a defendant with a capital offense does the case
undergo the previously discussed review.f 3 Because a large number of
cases do not undergo the review process, important information about
the racial demographics of these cases is missing.
Knowing the disposition of these cases is important. It is already
known that drug offenses involving crack cocaine are punished more
severely than offenses involving powder cocaine.' 4 It is also known that
black defendants are more likely to use crack cocaine and white
defendants more likely to use powder cocaine.' It is quite possible that
U.S. Attorneys will also treat the two offenses differently when making
charging decisions in capital cases. For instance, they may seek the death
penalty for murders involving crack but seek lesser sentences if powder
cocaine is involved.' 6 Thus, it is extremely difficult to conclude that
racism is not a part of the charging decision when there are a large
number of cases about which there is no data.
Second, a main theme of the study is that the death penalty
authorization rate is higher for whites (thirty-eight percent) than it is for
blacks (twenty-five percent) and Hispanics (twenty percent)." As
Professor David Baldus points out, this aspect of the study is flawed in
that it fails to take account of the fact that "white defendants are more
likely to have killed whites... and the U.S. Attorney charging and DOJ
181. See supra Part II; see also Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at
9.
182. Federal Death Penalty System Survey, supra note 61, at 9.
183. Id.
184. See generally Melissa C. Brown, Equal Protection in a Mean World: Why Judge
Cahill Was Right in United States v. Clary, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
307 (1997); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100.1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1233 (1996); Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not Snorted:
Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMPT. L.
121 (1994).
185. See generally Brown, supra note 184; Spade, supra note 184; Lowney, supra note
184.
186. Any person who kills during the manufacture, distribution, dispensing or
possession with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense of a controlled substance
may be sentenced to death. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 841 (2000).
187. See Federal Death Penalty System: Revised Protocols, supra note 173, at 8.
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authorization rates are much higher in white-victim cases than in
minority-victim cases."""
Third, the report fails to present any data or compelling reason for the
larger number of plea agreements concluded with white defendants
(forty-eight percent) than with black defendants (twenty-five percent)
and Hispanic defendants (twenty-eight)." Some make the weak
argument that non-invidious reasons, such as culture, may result in
minorities being less inclined to plea bargain. 9° Most criminal cases, by
some estimates more than ninety percent, result in plea bargains.' 9' If
minorities truly are less inclined to plea bargain than whites, this figure
would certainly be lower. However, the contrast is often true. Minorities
frequently plea bargain because they are indigent and are encouraged to
plea bargain by public defenders with heavy caseloads or appointed
counsel hoping to curry favor with a trial judge who wants to move the
docket along 29
The federal death penalty is in need of very few of the reforms
discussed earlier, yet racism in its implementation persists. For example,
conservative commentator Pat Robertson, when questioned about the
Justice Department's study and its finding that there was no racial bias in
the administration of capital punishment, noted:
Well, you know, the current Attorney General is a dear friend
of mine and I would hesitate to take issue with him, but on this
one, I think he's wrong if he - if that's his statement. Of
course, [John] Gotti could afford the very best lawyers, with all
the motions and procedures and summary motions that he
wants. And he walks where these [minorities] are executed.'9
If the federal government, with all these procedures and safeguards in
place, has been unable to eliminate racism in its death penalty process, it
would be unreasonable to expect the states, many with fewer resources
and a history of racism, to be successful in doing so.
188. Statement of Professor David Baldus, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/BaldusStatement.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
189. See Federal Death Penalty System: Revised Protocols, supra note 173, at 16.
190. See id.
191. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REv. 393,409 (2001).
192. See, e.g., Michael Tigar, Lawyers, Jails, and the Law's Fake Bargains, 53
MONTHLY REv. 29, 38-39 (2001) ("To be sure, many defendants who plead are in fact
guilty and are saving the state the trouble of trying them. But every year a distressing
number of cases come to light where defendants are railroaded into plea bargains.").
193. These remarks were made by Reverend Pat Robertson during a June 23, 2001
interview with Al Hunt that was broadcast on CNN's The Capital Gang. The transcript is
available at www.cnn.com/transcripts/0106/23/cg.00.html.
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B. The United States Military
Since World War II, the vast majority of service members sentenced to
death and executed have been African-American. During World War II,
although African Americans accounted for less than ten percent of the
Army, seventy-nine percent of those executed were African-American. 94
In 1948, President Truman ended segregation in the armed forces.' 95
However, the racial disparity in executions continued. Between 1954 and
1961, the military executed twelve individuals, eleven of whom were
African-American.' 96 The military's death penalty was reinstated in
1984.1"
The United States Constitution and its protections generally apply
with equal force to service members.' 9s Thus, service members accused
of crimes, like their civilian counterparts, have the right to counsel, to
confront witnesses, to a speedy trial, and to have only legally seized
evidence used against them. However, an accused service member is
provided with greater procedural protections than his or her civilian
counterpart.' 9 For instance, an accused service member has some choice
in the selection of counsel.""1 The accused service member has the right
to take depositions."" Before formal charges are brought against an





198. See Chief Justice Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 181 (1962). But see United States v. Corl, 6 M.J. 914, 915 (N.C.M.R. 1979) (holding
that an accused service member is not entitled to the Sixth Amendment protections of a
civilian jury trial).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12, 24 (C.M.A. 1986) (discussing the
right to discovery in the military justice context). Cf United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 463 (1996) (explaining that a defendant is not entitled to discover work product
documents).
200. Article 38 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that "[tjhe accused
shall have the right to be represented ... by military counsel of his own selection if [that
counsel] is reasonably available. . . ." UNIF CODE OF MIL. JUST. art. 38. In contrast, an
accused civilian has no constitutional right to choose a particular counsel. See Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that no Sixth Amendment violation of right to counsel
occurred when defendant was not allowed to have the lawyer of his choosing try the case).
201. See UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST. art 49. In contrast, in most jurisdictions, the
question of whether to grant the defendant an opportunity to conduct discovery is within
the discretion of the trial court. See Barry Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and
the Prosecution -- The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C. L. REV. 437, 474-
75 (1972). The decision to grant discovery can also be done by the grace of the prosecutor.
See RICHARD LEMPERT & STEPHEN SALZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
127-28 (2d ed. 1982)("Some might think such discovery by grace adequately protects the
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accused service member, an investigation must occur.202  This
investigation is the military's counterpart to the civilian grand jury. The
rights of a service member during investigation are much greater than the
rights of an accused civilian at a grand jury proceeding. At the
investigation, the accused has the right to be present and to have counsel
present throughout the investigation, 23 rights not available during the
civilian grand jury proceedings.2' The accused service member also has
the right to conduct discovery,2° to cross-examine and confront
witnesses,2 6 and to "present anything in defense, extenuation, or
mitigation" during the investigation, 2°7 none of which are available to the
accused during civilian grand jury proceedings.28 A service member
charged with a capital offense also has appellate rights that are more
extensive than those of his civilian counterpart, 209 and none of his appeals
will be considered by elected judges.210
legitimate interests of criminal defendants. But clearly any system which relies wholly on
discretion entrusted to one side is open to abuse and unfairness.").
202. UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST. art. 32.
203. See R.C.M. 405(0(3).
204. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 6(d)(1)-(2). The rules provide:
(d) Who May Be Present.
(1) While Grand Jury Is in Session. Attorneys for the government, the witness
under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking the
evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present while
the grand jury is in session.
(2) During Deliberations and Voting. No person other than the jurors ... may
be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
Id.
205. See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 7-2 (5th ed. 1999).
206. Id. at § 7-2(B)(4), at 321.
207. Id. at § 7-2(B)(7), at 324.
208. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 6(e)(2). The rule provides:
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the Government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury ....
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the prosecutor does not have an obligation
to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,
51-55 (1992).
209. For an overview of the military's appellate procedure, see the excerpt from
Dwight Sullivan, A Matter of Life and Death: Examining the Military Death Penalty's
Fairness, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/military.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2002).
210. For a discussion of the problems that result from elected judges deciding capital
cases, see Stephan B. Bright, et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising
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Today's military is also considered to be one of America's most
enlightened institutions when it comes to race relations.2" It is more
racially integrated than most universities, schools, corporations,
foundations, and the civilian government. 212 The military is integrated
not only at the lower levels of service but also at the highest officer
rankings. 213 In the military, racist behavior effectively terminates one's
career. Yet, despite its greater procedural protections and its perceived
tolerance and diversity, the military's death row continues to be
populated overwhelmingly with minorities, particularly African
Americans. As of April 2001, six of the seven inmates on the military's
death row were minorities, five of whom were African-American. 5
Thus, the military's history of disproportionately sentencing and
executing African Americans to death has continued into its more
"enlightened" era. If racial discrimination in death sentences cannot be
eliminated in an institution such as the military, which has worked
diligently and aggressively to root out racism in its ranks, it is hard to
imagine that it can be eliminated anywhere else.
C. Jurors
There is ample evidence that juror bias contributes substantially to the
racial disparity in capital sentencing.26 This evidence exists in the form
Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 123 (1999).
211. See, e.g., Clinton Thanks Military for Vigilance, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
23,1998, at 7A. President Clinton remarked:
As I look at this vast sea of highly representative and diverse faces, I am
reminded that it was 50 years ago this year, in 1948, when President Harry
Truman courageously ordered the integration of America's armed forces....
Now our armed forces are a model of unity and diversity for the entire world --
people of different origins coming together, working together, for the common
good.
Id. See also Terence Samuel, Despite Rifts, Army Still Leads in Race Relations, Study
Finds, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 27, 1998, at A5.
212. See F. Michael Higginbotham, A Military Strike Against Racism, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 25, 1998, at A15 (stating that "[t]he military is one of the most racially integrated
institutions in the country.").
213. Id.
214. See Charles Moskos & John Sibley Butler, Lessons on Race from the Army, CHI.
TRIB., July 26, 1998, at C15.
215. See The US. Military Death Penalty, supra note 194.
216. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 80-228 (1990); David Baldus et al.,
Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and
Legal Overview, with Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638
(1998).
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of juror sentencing decisions in federal capital cases, studies of actual
jury decision making, and mock jury studies.
One of the most astonishing and under-reported aspects of the Justice
Department's statistical study of federal capital cases was the racial
217disparity in sentencing by jurors. Once a defendant is convicted of a
federal capital defense, he is more likely to be sentenced to death by a
jury if he is black or Hispanic than if he is white. The Justice
Department's study indicated that between 1995 and 2000, forty-one
defendants were convicted of capital offenses.2 9  Eleven of these
defendants were white. 220 Juries recommended that four, or thirty-six
percent, of these defendants be sentenced to death. 2' Twenty-five of the
defendants convicted of a capital crime were black.22  Juries
recommended that thirteen, or fifty-two percent, be sentenced to
death.223 Juries also recommended that both of the Hispanic defendants
who had been convicted of capital offenses be sentenced to death.24
These statistics should raise a serious red flag because it is difficult to
find non-racial explanations for these disparities. One possibility is that
the white defendants had fewer aggravating factors and more mitigating
factors than the minority defendants. However, this is unlikely to
account for the disparity, given the fact that each federal capital case is
subject to a stringent multi-layered review process2 and that this review
most likely results in uniform decisions about when to seek a death
sentence. Another possible reason for the disparity is that white
defendants had better trial counsel. However, this is also an unlikely
explanation, given the fact that the same standards exist for the
appointment of trial counsel in federal capital cases.26 Thus, there is only
one conclusion; jurors were likely affected by either conscious or
unconscious biases in favor of the white defendants and against minority
defendants, and instructions given to the jurors before their deliberations
and certification requirements after the deliberations 27 were ineffective
in overcoming these biases.








225. See id. at 2-3.
226. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593.
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Studies of actual jury decisions also indicate that jurors are biased
against black defendants. One such study examined 252 defendants and
41 co-defendants in Philadelphia capital trials over the period from 1984
to 1994.2 Three dominant conclusions emerge. First, the study found
that "predominately non-black juries [ones with fewer than five blacks]
sentenced black and non-black defendants to death at a sixteen
percentage point black defendant disparity., 29  Second, this disparity
increased in cases involving white victims.2° Third, "black defendants
[were] treated less punitively vis-A-vis non-black defendants as the
proportion of blacks on the juries increase[d]." 31  Another study
involved interviews with 187 jurors who served on 53 capital cases tried
in South Carolina between 1986 and 1997.2 This study also found that
black jurors were more likely than white jurors to vote for life in
prison. 3' In addition, several studies of mock jurors in simulated cases
demonstrated a pattern of race-linked guilt and punishment decision-
making. These mock studies found that whites were more likely to
impose death on a black defendant,21 more likely to judge black
defendants as guilty, 35 more likely to convict if the victim was white ,36
and most likely to convict if the defendant was black and the victim was
white. 2  Finally, most disturbing was the finding that the defendant's
race was most influential in mid-range cases (cases in which the decision
could go either way). When the decision could go either way, "black
defendants were more likely to be given death sentences than were white
defendants." Thus, in close cases, race ended up being the determining
factor.
22& See Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 188.
229. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials, supra
note 44, at 124.
230. Id. at Table 8.
231. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era, supra note 216, at 1721 n.159.
232. Eisenberg et al., supra note 154, at 278.
233. Id.
234. See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional
Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 337, 349 (2000).
235. See Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 182 (citing Linda A. Foley & Minor H.
Chamblin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock Jurors' Decisions, 112 J. PSYCHOL.
47, 49 (1982)).
236. See Marina Miller & Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of
Juror- Victim Racial Similarity, 105 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 159, 160 (1978).
237. See Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 182-83.
238. Id. at 183-84.
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These statistics and studies indicate that white jurors are more punitive
in sentencing black defendants in general and black defendants who kill
whites in particular.239 This is a continuation of the decade-old practice
of punishing blacks more severely when they commit crimes against
whites. For instance, before rape was outlawed as a capital crime,
24°
ninety percent of the those legally executed for rape were black men24'
and almost all of these black men were convicted of raping white
women.242 These statistics and studies also suggest that by punishing
defendants who kill whites more severely than those who kill blacks,
jurors are placing a higher value on white life.243
Why are white jurors more punitive toward black defendants? These
statistics and studies are not intended to suggest that white jurors are
engaging in overt bigotry; that is, during deliberation, jurors are not
openly suggesting that a black defendant should be executed because he
killed a white person. In the vast majority of cases, overt racism does not
affect jury decisions.2" Rather, a more subtle, subconscious, systemic
racism is at work. White jurors probably identify more with white
victims, and they fail to see remorse in black defendants. 524 Many white
239. See, e.g., id. at 181-89; Richard C. Dieler, The Death Penalty in Black and White:
Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Decides, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
racerpt.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).
240. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty for
rape violates the Eighth Amendment).
241. See NINA RIVKIND & STEVEN SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH
PENALTY 211-12 (2001).
242. See Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 38
n.47 (1984).
243. In a 1986 training tape for Philadelphia prosecutors, then-homicide prosecutor
Jack McMahon argued that a reasonable representation of blacks on the jury is necessary
to protect against possible jury nullification by non-black jurors in black-on-black
homicides because these cases may not generate much concern for the victim by non-black
jurors. See Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials,
supra note 44, at 43.
244. However, there are still examples of overt juror bigotry towards black defendants.
See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Texas Travesty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at A21. In the case of
Napoleon Beazley, a juvenile sentenced to death for the murder of a federal appellate
judge's father, one of the jurors was a member of the United Daughters of the
Confederacy and flew the Confederate flag from her home. id.
A fellow juror, when contacted by a defense investigator during the appeals
process, was heard to say, "The nigger got what he deserved." That juror's wife
gave the defense team an affidavit that said her husband was "racially
prejudiced" and that she found it difficult to believe he could have "set his
prejudice aside" for Mr. Beazley's trial.
Bob Herbert, Tainted Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A13.
245. See Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 215 ("Beliefs that the defendant was
remorseful for the crime were more common among black than white jurors and most
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jurors believe that black defendants are more dangerous,2 6 which leads
them to find that black defendants pose a continuing danger to society.
They are less likely to look at lower education levels, past drug use,
mental illness, and disadvantaged upbringings as mitigating
circumstances. One commentator stated:
Unconsciously perhaps, whites as jurors carry into the jury box
and the jury room this cultural baggage of the dangerous black
male predator and the need for punitiveness. Prosecutors seek
to take advantage of this cultural paraphernelia at the
sentencing stage of death penalty trials by making arguments
that embody negative racial imagery and stereotypes.249
One of the main reasons to believe that racism will affect decision-
making in capital cases in the foreseeable future, and that the death
penalty therefore cannot be fixed, is the difficulty of eradicating this type
of racism. These attitudes, because they are subconscious and not even
acknowledged, are difficult to eliminate or even to address. These
attitudes will persist among jurors as long as they persist in broader
society.
Very little that has not already been done can be done to overcome
such juror biases. Jurors are rightly given autonomy during
deliberations, and they do not have to justify their decisions. 0 However,
two suggestions made by other academics are worthy of examination.
First, a jury that includes African Americans is less likely to sentence any
common among black jurors in B/W cases; white jurors were least likely to see black
defendants as remorseful.").
246. See id. at 219-27; see generally Kim Taylor Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury
Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261 (2001) (citing studies that demonstrate that juror
perceptions of aggressiveness and dangerousness are affected by racial considerations).
247. In some states, in order to sentence a defendant to death, the jury must find that
the defendant "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society." TEX. CRIM. CODE PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2 (Vernon 2002); see also
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1999).
248. See Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 248-50 (noting that black jurors saw a black
defendant as having a "[d]isadvantaged [u]pbringing, [riemorse, and [s]incerily," while
white jurors saw the same defendant as incorrigible, with little emotion and capable of
"[d]eceptive [b]ehavior"); Lynch & Haney, supra note 234, at 353 (In this mock juror
study, white jurors "were significantly more likely to undervalue, disregard, and even
improperly use mitigating evidence" in a black defendant case as opposed to a white
defendant case.).
249. Bowers et al., supra note 18, at 180.
250. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Jurors' responsibilities terminate when their case ends; they answer only to their
consciences; they rarely have any concern about possible reprisals after their work is
done.").
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defendant to death.2' A jury composed of African Americans will not be
as punitive toward African-American defendants. In addition, an
African-American presence on a jury is likely to deter overt bigotry and
challenge unfounded stereotypes white jurors may have about blacks.
Thus, one way of minimizing juror bias is to ensure that juries,
particularly capital juries, include African Americans. The Supreme
Court's Batson decision was supposed to diversify juries, but that has not
happened. Minorities, particularly African Americans, continue to be
removed from juries, and the courts have refused to police these
practices.2  Professor Kenneth Nunn suggests that whenever racial
issues might affect a criminal trial, the litigants should be prohibited from
using their peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors. 3
Furthermore, he argues that black defendants should "be free to
peremptorily challenge white jurors for the purpose of increasing the
probability of [b]lack participation on his or her jury.
' '
Although provocative and academically appealing, Professor Nunn's
proposal is not a realistic solution to the problem of under-
representation of blacks on juries. First, it is extremely unlikely that the
current Supreme Court would approve of a measure permitting the
removal of white, but not black, jurors or would otherwise permit the use
of race in addressing the problem.2 5 Second, any proposal to increase
the pool of minority jurors must take into account the fact that blacks are
more likely to be disqualified from serving on the jury. For instance,
about seven percent of African Americans and one in seven black men
are ineligible for jury service because of their criminal records.216 In
251. See Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 3.
252- See generally id.
253. Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory
Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 113-17 (1993).
254. Id. at 115.
255. The Supreme Court has used strict scrutiny analysis to strike down state and
federal preferences for racial minorities. See generally Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227,
238-39 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274, 285-86 (1986).
256. See Butler, supra note 24, at 707 (stating that "one in seven black men is legally
disenfranchised because of a criminal record"); John Mark Hansen, Disnfranchisement of
Felons, July 2001, available at http://millercenter.virginia.edu/pdf/commission final_
report/task forcereport/hansenschap8_disfranchisement.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2002).
In the more active death penalty states, the percentage of blacks ineligible for jury service
as a result of a felony conviction is larger than the national average of seven percent and
several times larger than it is for whites. See id. For instance, in Alabama, 12.41% of
blacks have felony convictions, compared to 4.26% of whites. Id. In Florida, 13.77% of
blacks have felony convictions, while 5.07% of whites do. Id. In Texas, 8.77% of blacks
have felony convictions, compared to 2.95% of whites. Id. In Virginia, 13.82% of blacks
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addition, because blacks are more likely to oppose capital punishment,27
they are likely to be challenged and removed for cause72' Finally, in
communities with small African-American populations, the problem is
even more pronounced. In Utah, for example, blacks make up only one
percent of the state's population but "of the eight death sentences
affirmed on appeal between 1973 and 1986, four of those sentences were
against black men," and in "all of those cases, the victims were white." 59
Thus, in those states with a small African-American population, it is
impossible to increase black participation on juries.
Professor David McCord suggests that, because juries are not well-
trained, they should no longer be involved in capital sentencing
decisions.6" According to Professor McCord, "[m]any of the errors in
capital cases arise from ill-fated efforts to educate jurors concerning their
sentencing duties. 2 6' Thus, Professor McCord believes that judges
should do the sentencing. In many states, however, judges are elected262
and thus would likely be inclined to impose death. 63 Furthermore, it is
have felony convictions, compared to 3.35% of whites. See id. In addition, there are many
other impediments to minority jury service. For example, minorities are more likely to fail
to register for elections or with the state motor-vehicle department and thus are
automatically excluded from the selection process. See HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE
AND THE JURY 44-47 (1993). Statutory qualifications, such as being mentally and
physically sound and having good character, often rely on subjective criteria in
determining the eligibility of potential jurors. "There is no doubt that such subjective
evaluations have played an important role in creating racially demarcated juries in the
race-conscious court structure in the South." Id. at 52. Finally, blacks and Hispanics are
more likely to request to be excused from jury service as a result of personal obligations or
difficulty in traveling to the courthouse. Id. at 55.
257. Only twenty-four percent of African Americans support the death penalty,
compared to sixty-two percent of whites, fifty percent of Hispanics, and thirty-three
percent of Asians. See, e.g., Allan Turner, A Deadly Distinction; Bloodthirsty Image at
Odds with Local Poll, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2001, at Al.
258. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a juror whose opposition to the death
penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties at the sentencing phase of a capital trial may be removed for cause. See Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 179-84 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,424-25,430 (1985).
259. Kevin Cantera, Execution Too Harsh for Tillman, Lawyers Say, SALT LAKE
TRIB., May 3, 2001, at Bl.
260. See David McCord, Open Letter to Governor George Ryan Concerning How To
Fix the Death Penalty System, 32 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 451,461 (2001).
261. Id. at 463 (footnotes omitted).
262. "There are currently thirty-eight states that have capital punishment statutes.
Thirty-two states both elect their judges and sentence people to death." Stephen B. Bright
& Patrick Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights
and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 779 (1995)(footnotes
omitted).
263. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Not
surprisingly, given the political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to
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incorrect to blame jurors for most of the errors in capital cases. A recent
study found that ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial
misconduct accounted for most of the appellate reversals of capital
cases.26 The responsibility for ineffective lawyers rests with the judges
who appoint them and observe their performance at trial. The
responsibility for prosecutorial misconduct rests with the prosecutor.
Thus, Professor McCord's proposal to eliminate juries from the
sentencing process is unlikely to make the process any better and would
likely make it worse.
D. Societal Racism
Almost all aspects of American life-employment,26' voting,2 66 legal
education, the legal profession,26 schools, 269 access to medical care,270
impose the death penalty."); see also id. at 521-22 n.8 (citing statistics from Florida and
Indiana that demonstrate that judges "override juries' life recommendations far more
often than their death recommendations").
264. See Liebman et al., supra note 130, at 1850.
265. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal: An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
(2001), available at http://findjustice.com/nnr/news/eisenber-schwab/schwab-report.htm
(last visited Apr. 3, 2002) (finding that federal appellate courts are more likely to reverse a
plaintiff's verdict in employment discrimination cases than any other civil plaintiff's
verdict).
266. Following the disputed presidential election in Florida, allegations were made
that a large number of black voters were misidentified as felons, causing them to be
purged from the voter rolls. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH
COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 213 n.20, 227 n.15 (2001). In addition, a
disproportionate number of disqualified ballots came from predominately minority
sections of the state, outdated voting machines were often employed in predominately
minority areas, and there were allegations that local police employed roadblocks in
minority areas as a form of intimidation. Id.
267. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Accusations of Bias Roil Florida Law School, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at A12 (stating that a black associate dean at the University of
Florida's law school resigned because, allegedly, professors were blocking the hiring of
black professors and had resisted the promotion of black professors who had already been
hired).
26& See Jonathan D. Glater, Few Minorities Rising to Law Partner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2001, at Al (A study of the seven highest grossing law firms in America showed that
minority lawyers accounted for about five percent of the new partners in recent years).
269. See, e.g., Breaking the Hickory Stick, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2001, at A16
("Disadvantaged and minority children face corporal punishment at a higher rate than
others.").
270. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Health Gap Grows, With Black Americans Trailing
Whites, Studies Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998, at A16. Academic research shows a
widening gap between blacks and others in incidences of infant mortality (blacks - 15.1 out
of 1000 births, all people - 7.6), maternal mortality (blacks - 22.1 out of 100,000 births, all
people -7.1), tuberculosis (blacks - 23.9 for every 100,000 people, all people 8.7), diabetes-
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27127the criminal justice system, commercial transactions27 and even access
to a taxi173 - are influenced by race. The criminal justice system is
presently grappling with the issue of racial profiling. Sixty percent of
African-American men report that they have been unfairly stopped by
the police because of their race.274  The Missouri Attorney General
studied traffic stops and searches in Missouri to determine whether and
to what extent racial profiling existed in his state. The study determined
that blacks were thirty percent more likely to be stopped by police than
whites and seventy percent more likely to be searched following a
routine traffic stop.275 Traffic offenses represent the most minor offenses
in our criminal justice system, yet they are meted out in a racially
discriminatory manner.276 If racism continues to exist in issuing traffic
tickets, how can it be eradicated in meting out punishment in highly
emotional capital cases often involving horrific murders? There is simply
no way to eliminate racism in the death penalty process without
eliminating racism in broader society. Any attempt to do so will prove
futile. As long as racism exists in society, it will produce racist results in
many aspects of American life.
related deaths (blacks - 76 of every 100,000 people, all people - 40), cancer (blacks - 172
deaths for every 100,00 people, all people - 130), heart disease (blacks - 147 deaths for
every 100,000 people, all people - 108), and stroke (blacks - 45 for every 100,000, all people
- 26.7). These disparities in death rates are attributed to the fact that blacks receive worse
health care than whites. See id. Limited education, violence and addiction are also
factors. See id.
271. See generally David A. Harris, Racial Profiling on Our Nation's Highways,
available at http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2002)
(discussing the problem of racial profiling); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); Kevin R.
Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q.
675 (2000); Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for
Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551 (1997).
272 See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Review of Nissan Car Loans Finds That Blacks Pay
More, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at Al (discussing statistical study that shows "black
customers in 33 states consistently paid more than white customers, regardless of their
credit histories").
273. See, e.g., Monte Williams, Danny Glover Says Cabbies Discriminated Against
Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at B8.
274. African Americans Feel They Are Treated Unfairly By Police, (CNN Television
Broadcast, July 27, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.com/transcripts/0107/27/lt.13. html
(discussing the results of a recent Gallup survey).
275. See Tim O'Neil, Missouri Study on Traffic Stops Mirrors Others, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, June 3,2001, at Al.
276. See, e.g, id.
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Mistakes in capital cases are inevitable. Professor Charles Black made
this argument in 19 74 ,27 yet despite advances in science and technology,
such as DNA and lie detectors, his words are as true today as they were
then. Humans are fallible, and they make mistakes. Police, prosecutors,
judges, and jurors are all human and will continue to make mistakes.
In addition, capital cases are especially prone to mistakes. There is
usually tremendous pressure on law enforcement officials to solve the
murder. In addition, capital cases are highly emotional and extremely
complicated. As a result, an entire body of law exists, applicable solely
to capital cases.278
Serious mistakes have been acknowledged since the reinstatement of
capital punishment in 1976. To date, approximately one hundred
inmates in twenty-four states have been wrongly convicted and have
been released from death row, and the list continues to grow.279 A
Supreme Court Justice recently stated her belief that innocent
individuals may have already been executed.m Finally, what better
illustration that mistakes are inevitable in capital cases than the case of
Timothy McVeigh. McVeigh was one of the most dangerous terrorists in
American history. The government spent millions of dollars on his
case.28 Yet, on the eve of his execution, the government announced that
it had made a mistake by failing to turn over documents to McVeigh's
lawyers."3 If a mistake of this magnitude can occur in McVeigh's case-
in spite of its publicity, the amount of resources expended, and the
extensive federal procedures designed to prevent mistakes from
277. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974).
278. See generally RIVKIND & SHATZ, supra note 241; RANDALL COYNE & LYN
ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1994).
279. The Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, at
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2002) (reporting statistics on
wrongfully convicted inmates).
280. In a July 2, 2001 address to the Minnesota Women Lawyer's group, Justice
Sandra O'Connor said: "If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing
some innocent defendants to be executed." See Justice O'Connor Questions Death
Penalty, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/newvoices.html.
281. See Rick Bragg, On Eve of His Execution, McVeigh's Legacy Remains Death and
Pain, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2001, at A26 (reporting that Timothy McVeigh killed 149
adults and 19 children).
282. See Benjamin Weiser, Government Pays Over 7 Million for Defense in Embassy
Bombings Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at B1 (estimating that the government spent
$82 million investigating and prosecuting McVeigh). See also Mindy Sink, McVeigh's
Defense Cost Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2001, at A9 (reporting that McVeigh's
defense cost $13.8 million).
283. See Bragg, supra note 281.
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occurring-one cringes when imagining the mistakes that are made in
less publicized cases involving indigent defendants, without many
resources and represented by less than able counsel. With regard to
mistakes, a Texas federal judge stated: "[T]he state probably ought not
be allowed to do things it cannot undo because it is at least as error prone
as other human organizations. '" '
This paper has demonstrated that the death penalty, as presently
applied in the United States, cannot be completely reformed. There is
simply too much racism and too many mistakes for it to be an effective
and morally justifiable form of punishment. The conclusions in this
article, however, are subject to two possible attacks. First, a detractor
might argue that racism and mistakes are not unique to the death
penalty. These problems are endemic to the entire criminal justice
system, yet no one would advocate that the criminal justice system be
dispensed with because of these problems. Just as the criminal justice
system should be reformed rather than abolished, capital punishment
should also be reformed, not abolished. In response, an argument can be
made that, as flawed as the criminal justice system may be, there is no
alternative to it that would adequately protect society. A just society
must punish wrongdoers, and some of these individuals must be
incarcerated to protect its citizens. Moreover, the threat of criminal
punishment deters crime. In contrast, there is an alternative to capital
punishment that adequately protects society: incarcerating individuals
convicted of capital murder. Most of the modern evidence suggests that
the threat of capital punishment does not deter murder and other capital
crimes.2"" Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long recognized the
obvious-that death is different.2 It is, of course, repugnant that
innocent individuals are incarcerated and have their liberty taken away
from them. However, this pales in comparison to wrongfully executing
someone. While it may be inevitable that some mistakes have to be
tolerated in the criminal justice system, these same mistakes are
intolerable when death is involved.
A second attack on this article's conclusions might be that several
measures, which were intended to reform the death penalty, have been
implemented throughout the criminal justice system, and if the death
penalty no longer existed, the rationale for these reforms would no
284. Davis v. Johnson, 8 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907 (S.D. Tex 1998).
285. See Raymond Bonner & Ford Fessenden, Absence of Executions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting statistics showing that states with no death penalty share
lower homicide rates).
286. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
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longer exist. For instance, the greater availability of DNA testing
resulted from concerns over wrongfully convicted capital defendants, but
this reform has been adopted throughout the criminal justice system and
has helped to free other wrongfully convicted inmates.2 Although the
criminal justice system has benefitted from these reforms, it is certainly
in need of further reform. Rigorous analysis of the death penalty has
helped to expose numerous flaws in the criminal justice system as a
whole and has been a catalyst for change. However, it is illogical to
retain the unjust system of capital punishment in order to introduce
further reform to the entire criminal justice system. Rather, it is
incumbent upon academics, defense lawyers, judges, conscientious
prosecutors, and others to continue to expose the flaws in the system and
to pursue much needed reforms.
The movement internationally, particularly in Europe, is away from
capital punishment. What should the United States do about capital
punishment? What about the growing moratorium movement? Should
individuals concerned with the way in which the death penalty is imposed
in this country support this movement? The next section addresses these
questions.
IV. PROPOSAL
The moratorium movement, while well-intentioned, will have the
effect of legitimating the death penalty. The movement represents a
concession on the part of abolitionists that the death penalty can be
"fixed" as long as certain measures have been implemented. Obviously,
once the death penalty is "fixed," its proponents will argue that these
reforms will need sufficient time to work. During this time, the death
penalty will continue to be imposed in a racially discriminatory manner
and mistakes will persist, resulting in the continued execution of innocent
individuals. In the meantime, critics will be precluded from arguing for
the death penalty's abolition because they urged a moratorium and
participated in its "reform." As scholars Carol and Jordan Steiker state:
There are at least two ways ... in which legislative reform of
the death penalty could legitimate the practice of capital
punishment. The first is virtually identical to the kind of
legitimation we described as a by-product of judicial reform of
the death penalty-that is, some reforms may do very little to
287. See Innocence Project: Cardozo School of Law, at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/
innocence-project/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2002) (stating that since the advent of
DNA testing, at least sixty-three people have been legally exonerated through DNA
testing and set free).
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change the underlying practice but may offer the appearance of
much greater procedural regularity than they actually produce,
thus inducing a false or exaggerated belief in the fairness of the
entire system of capital punishment....
The second form of legitimation, which was implicated
though to a much lesser degree by judicial reform, is the
legitimation inherent in every kind of incremental change. That
is, even when reform does not induce a false or exaggerated
belief in the progress being made, it will always induce at least
some satisfaction in the real improvements achieved, and thus,
will make people more comfortable than they otherwise would
be with the underlying practice, thereby dissipating continued
scrutiny of the death penalty and energy toward abolition.9
Rather than legitimate the death penalty by calling for a moratorium,
opponents should call for its abolition on the ground that it cannot be
fixed because it will never be fairly implemented. No further political
capital should be spent pursuing a moratorium. Opponents of capital
punishment should seek instead to educate the public about capital
punishment. Opponents should point out the fact that capital punishment
is not a deterrent to murder.289 Furthermore, the public should be
informed that no nation in the world has been successful in administering
the death penalty. Unlike socialism or national health care, whose
proponents can identify nations in which these systems have at least
arguably been successfully employed, proponents of capital punishment
can point to no nation where capital punishment has been even arguably
successful.
Does this mean that society can never reserve the right to execute
anyone? It is apparent that executions can be carried out and are
morally justifiable only if they are truly necessary to protect society.
During the sentencing phase of capital cases, juries are routinely required
to determine whether the defendant is a continuing threat to society. In
the overwhelming majority of cases, society would be protected by
incarcerating the defendant for life. In addition, inmates convicted of
288. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support State
Legislative "Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO L.J. 417, 422 (2002).
289. See Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoria on Executions, 33 CONN.
L. REV. 845, 852-53 (2001) ("There is widespread agreement among both criminologists
and law enforcement officials that capital punishment has little curbing effect on homicide
rates superior to long term imprisonment."). See also Raymond Bonner & Ford
Fessenden, Death Penalty Fails To Deter Crime, Research Shows, SUNDAY GAZETrE
MAIL, Sept. 24, 2000, at 6C. But see Wesley Lowe, Wesley's Pro Death Penalty Webpage,
at http://geocities.com/Area51 ?Capsule/2698/cp.html.
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murder rarely commit other homicides.29 Furthermore, those sentenced
to death represent only a tiny fraction of murderers.291 Most murderers
who are incarcerated and remain in prison do not inflict any further harm
on others.29 Thus, juries have not been truly honest in answering this
question.
There are two types of murderers who may potentially pose a
continuing threat to society: war criminals and mass murderers. Many
European nations that have abolished the death penalty have reserved
capital punishment for war criminals.293  These nations were almost
destroyed by such individuals and know firsthand the havoc they can
wreak on a society. War criminals are a continuing threat because they
often have followers and may be able to mastermind criminal schemes
from prison and have them carried out by their followers. The classic
example of such an individual was Adolph Hitler. No society would have
been safe from Hitler. His rise to power was initially conceived from
prison, and had he survived World War II, he would have been a
continuing threat to the world given his worldwide following.294 Society
should reserve the right to execute someone like him in the future. Mass
murderers pose similar threats. Individuals such as Osama bin Laden are
a continuing threat because, like war criminals, they may have a
following and may pose a danger to society even if incarcerated.
The death penalty ought to be retained for these two types of killers
despite the problems normally associated with the death penalty. Such
problems will usually not be present in these cases, which are always very
high profile and receive heavy media and public scrutiny. As a result,
superb counsel usually step forward to represent these defendants.
Adequate resources will be provided to the defense. 295 Importantly, racewill not be a factor because these crimes are so heinous that death will
290. See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, Criminology: An Actuarial Risk
Assessment of Violence Posed By Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1254-56 (2000); see also Wendy Phillips Wolfson, The Deterrent
Effect of the Death Penalty Upon Prison Murder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
167 (H. Bedau ed. 1982).
291. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 375
(1995).
292. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 290, at 1256; Wolfson, supra note 290, at 167.
293. Thirteen nations have retained the death penalty for "exceptional" crimes (i.e.,
during wartime). See Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Report 2000 22 (2000).
294. For instance, Hitler's birthday is still celebrated by many. See, e.g., Troops Keep
Peace on Hitler's 100th, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1989, at 6.
295. See Sink, supra note 282 (reporting that Timothy McVeigh's defense cost the
government $13.8 million and that he employed nineteen lawyers).
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usually be sought and imposed irrespective of race.29 Mistakes are still
possible, however, as the McVeigh case illustrates.297  Nonetheless,
because of the publicity and amount of resources devoted to the case, it
is likely that any mistakes will come to light and be remedied, as in the
McVeigh case. Finally, as a result of the resources expended on these
cases and the publicity and scrutiny they generate, we can usually rest
assured that the defendant, if convicted, is in fact guilty of the offense
and was properly convicted and sentenced.
V. CONCLUSION
The death penalty is being studied by several states. Other groups and
individuals have also studied the issue, and many reforms have been
proposed. However, most of these studies and proposed reforms fail to
sufficiently address the issue of race and capital punishment.29 Rather,
the assumption these groups and individuals make is that once the death
penalty system has been reformed, race will no longer be an issue. This
is a naYve and dangerous assumption given this nation's history with
racism. Race is still a major issue in this nation, and studies of the death
penalty must acknowledge this fact. On the same day that a majority of
the judges on the Fifth Circuit finally conceded that a sleeping lawyer is
indeed ineffective,29 the Supreme Court refused to stop the execution of
an African-American juvenile sentenced to death by an all-white jury,
which included one juror who was the president of the United Daughters
of the Confederacy and another who believed that "the nigger got what
he deserved." ° These two cases illustrate the point this article attempts
to make-that as long as race is a dominant issue in this society, it will be
a dominant issue in the administration of the death penalty.
296. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]here exist certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which ... juries
consistently impose the death penalty without regard to... race .. .
297. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
298. For example, Arizona released a study of how capital punishment is administered
in Arizona. See Capital Case Commission Interim Report, available at
http://www.ag.state.az.us/CCC/Intrpt.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002). The report made
several recommendations designed to improve the system, but it failed to discuss any of
the racial issues that have been a barrier to the fair administration of the death penalty.
Id.
299. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
300. See Herbert, supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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